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Chapter 5. Parkland

Originally, the plot called for no stop at Parkland
Hospital. As a Texas congressman remarked after the third
shot and the halt of the motorcade: "If all is well ahead,
we are headed for Love Field. We are getting out." At
the time of the shooting, he was unable to see the limousine
from his position.

Apparently, the plan was to shoot only the President, and the President's physician would pronounce him dead on 2 the spot. Since the fatal wounds made further medical attention unnecessary, the party would then rush to Love Field and fly to Washington, D.C., while the Vice-President and his Secret Service agents expressed grave concern about a world-wide conspiracy.

But credibility was important in a cover story that featured a "mentally unstable sniper." Wounding the Texas Governor, Connally, would help it. If both an Wastern liberal and a Southern conservative were shot, then it would seem to be a senseless act rather than a political one, especially a "Texas plot." At the last moment, the plotters shot

Connally. It was appropriate then when the Fxecutive Assistant to the Vice-President told Mrs. Johnson on the night of the assassination: "...the salvation of Texas is that the Governor was hit." The Vice-President's wife responded, "Don't think I haven't thought of that."

They had to stop at Parkland Hospital because Connally was wounded. But stopping there created more problems than it solved for the plotters because a team of doctors saw the President's wounds.

The public might have believed that someone had shot the President from behind with a rifle if it resulted in a simple head wound. But then the Parkland doctors held a press conference and talked about an entrance wound at the front and a throat wound, as well as a head wound.

The reports of the doctors' press conference were heard aboard the Presidential plane as it flew toward Washington.

D.C. The new President, his physician.

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their Secret Service agents listened carefully.

Most likely the decision had to be made on the plane to mutilate the President's body at Bethesda Naval Hospital in Washington, D.C. It had to be done in such a fashion as to disprove the contentions of the Parkland doctors and to ensure the credibility of the cover story of a sniper firing from above and behind the President.

Bethesda also created problems for the plotters because they did not want an autopsy. But to get to Bethesda, under

alone, these two facts indicate that Oswald may have had a non-economic reason for taking the job at the TSBD /depository/."

With Oswald in place, the Secret Service - the only agency with the authority to control the President's movements - could act. The motorcade route was planned to pass in front of where Oswald worked. This way it would appear that coincidence placed Oswald in the assassination zone.

Had the route been publicly announced weeks before the Presidential visit, the Secret Service would have had to check the route carefully and later explain why they failed to keep someone like Oswald under surveillance.

In early November 1963, Secret Service agent Robert I. Bouck of the Protective Research Section (PRS) claimed. "No cards were found in the file that would indicate the presence of any known seriously dangerous PRS subjects as residing in the Dallas area... This was asserted despite the attempted shooting of Gen. Walker in April 1963 and the attack on Ambassador Stevenson in October 1963. Agent Kellerman confirmed this: "The Protective Research Section did not furnish to the White House Detail any reports of protective research-type subjects in the Dallas area, as that office did not have any record of such subjects." 57 Secret Service Chief Rowley reported to the Warren Commission that the PRS file of persons considered a threat to the President "...contained approximately 100 names on November 22. 1963. covering the United States and certain foreign countries. Prior to the President's trip to Dallas, it was checked and no person was listed in the Dallas area." 50

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*...advised that as the ranking Secret Service agent with the President's party, he was responsible for the presidential security in Dallas. He stated the advanced security arrangements made for this specific trip were the most stringent and thorough ever employed by the Secret Service for the visit of a President to an American city.*59

Rowley later told the Commission, however, *...Kellerman denies that he made the statement attributed to him concern-

Loyalist Cabinet officers were isolated in an airplane over the Pacific Ocean, hours away from land. Their only link to the outside world was a single news teletype in the forward compartment, which reported a distorted picture of actual events. The radiophone was useless because the code book, which was essential to high-level communication, was missing.

Using various cover stories, the plotters camouflaged the take-over. Within the first few hours of the assassination, rumors circulated about a "world-wide plot" and a "prelude to a global Pearl Harbor." This distracted the attention of high officials who might otherwise have acted against the plotters.


Following the assiassination, the new regime eased public apprehension by repeated assurances that no conspiracy existed; that the late President's policies would remain unchanged. Quietly, however, Kennedy's policy of keeping combat troops out of Vietnam was reversed by his former Vice-President, whose only path to the Presidency and away from disgrace and early political retirement was over Kennedy's dead body.

To maintain continuity, to give the appearance of stability, and to dispel any sense of unlawful seizure of power, the new government requested that the former Cabinet stay in office. To safeguard the cover story, evidence was managed to deceive genuine investigators and a commission of inquiry.

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If people were predisposed toward the cover story, then they would be unable to conceive that individuals in high places killed their President. This mental preconditioning guaranteed that some would reject a true account of the murder. Furthermore, with the mass media immediately available to the new government, information was released continuously so to render any reports of a plot as fantasy.

A blind faith in their government by some Americans was a source of encouragement to those who contrived to short-circuit the representative system. The plotters gauged this weakness correctly.



Rusk and the Cabinet Plane.

The date of the assassination coincided with the third U.S.-Japan Joint Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs to meet in Tokyo on November 25-27th. The trip was first announced in the United States on Aug. 26. 1963. The Japanese Foreign Office did so on November 8th. This high-level conference meant that certain Cabinet officers would be absent from Washington, D.C.

on Nov. 22, 1963, over half the Cabinet members were sealed in a single plane over the mid-Pacific on their way to Japan, hours away from the capital. This constituted "...more members of the United States Cabinet 6 out of a total of 107 than had ever joined together before in a single mission overseas." One of the Cabinet members on the plane was the Secretary of the Treasury. The Secret Service is a division of the Treasury Dept. and under its direction. Had the Treasury Secretary been in Washington, D.C., he might have been able to obstruct the plot.

When word first arrived on the plane of the shooting.

members of the party sought to verify the news. Dean Rusk,

Secretary of State, ordered the Presidential press secretary. Pierre Salinger, to contact the White House situation

room by code on the radiophone. According to Salinger.

"Aboard every Presidential jet there is usually a White

House code book. We searched for it for about five minutes.

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but as fate would have it there was none aboard this

the guise of having to remove the bullets, compelled an autopsy. The altered body would have to pass under the scrutiny of more eyes. Furthermore, the alterations had to be sufficient enough to deceive inexperienced autopsy physicians.

Yet, despite these disadvantages, military doctors did not present the same problems as the civilian doctors at Parkland. Military discipline meant that orders issued would be obeyed. Pathologists could be selected and manipulated, and, within limits, evidence could be destroyed.

Adm. George G. Burkley would see that the naval pathologists maximum deceived.

Arrival.

Despite the radio link to the hospital. the President received almost no attention when the limousine arrived at Parkland. An ABC White House correspondent in the motorcade thought that the hospital had been given little, if any, advance notification. Not a single doctor met the limousine. Furthermore, the President lay in the back seat unattended for a minute or two before a stretcher was brought out.

According to Connally's wife. "We pulled into the emergency entrance of Parkland Hospital and it seemed to me an eternity before anyone moved. My husband was dying in my arms and I wanted somebody to do something fast." 7

While stretchers were being taken to the Presidential limousine, the Vice-President's group hurried into the hospital surrounded by his Secret Service detail. Johnson was taken in by five Secret Service agents, "...the nucleus of the future White House Detail." They were inside Parkland before the President and Connally were removed from the limousine.

While some were in a state of shock at this point, those seizing power were busy.

A temporary command post was set up in the emergency area on the first floor in a minor medical suite. Though the President was not yet technically dead, the Vice-President was firmly in command of communications. Contact was established with the Signal Corps post in downtown Dallas, the Pentagon, the White House situation room, and the Cabinet plane over the Pacific Ocean.

A military communications officer and police searched the hospital for phones. Fach time one was located, it was given to a Dallas policeman with instructions to guard it. 12

Kennedy loyalists tried to call out. For example, they asked a Dallas policeman at the hospital to have his dispatcher arrange a line for them. The police dispatcher said that all his lines were tied up. 13 Kennedy loyalists had been effectively isolated at the hospital from the rest of the world.

Johnson, anticipating an investigation, had his wife

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and others with him, including Secret Service agents, write self-serving notes on the situation. Consequently, "all these later became the basis of the White House log."

Secret Service Behavior.

According to a Dallas police officer, the conduct of the Secret Service at Parkland resembled that of "a police state."

The first notice received by hospital staff occurred when two Secret Service agents burst into the emergency 16 area; one waved a sub-machine gun.

An FBI agent, attempting to track down evidence in the emergency area, was assaulted by two Secret Service agents before he could present his credentials.

The Secret Service was concerned that no photographs were made of the President in the back of the limousine and during the time he was taken to the emergency room. A Texas Highway Patrolman said. "We were assigned by the Secret Service to prevent any pictures of any nature to be taken of the President's car or the inside."

Another Highway Patrolman stated. "...we were instructed to keep the news media away from the car."

A Security Officer of the Dallas County Hospital District also "...helped keep press people and spectators away from the Presidential car."

Photographs would indicate bullet damage and direction.

An hour after the President had been taken inside, the Secret Service assaulted a young boy who had a movie camera. He was filming the emergency entrance area where the limousine was parked. They tore the camera from his hands, opened it, and kicked the unwinding film down the street.

Concern over photographers caused the Chief of the

Dallas field office of the Secret Service to make false statements to the FBI later. 22

Throat Wound.

Parkland doctors found a small wound in the front and at the middle of the President's neck, below the Adam's apple.

Dr. Perry said that the size of the wound was originally only a "few millimeters in diameter."

A millimeter is equal to 0.04 of an inch. The wound was fairly round to oval in shape.

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round to a diagrams this.

Adam's Apple Wound

The doctors found no powder burns. Powder residues usually are present if the distance between muzzle and target is less than 18 inches. The doctors' concern with these indicated their belief that the throat wound was one of entrance, made # close range.

Dr. Jones felt that the wound's smooth edges were the result of a low-velocity bullet. For Dr. Akin, "...if

the President had been shot with a low velocity missile.


such as fire from a pistol, it was more likely to have been an entrance wound..."

Furthermore, he continued, low velocity missiles of small caliber, i.e., .22 to .32, "...are slow moving, and they enter the body and don't leave it.

They usually stay in it..."

Blood was slowly oozing out of the neck wound. Dr.

Perry believed that the wound indicated possible underlying damage to an artery or vein. or to the windpipe. He made a cut of a few millimeters directly across and through the wound, into the second tracheal ring of the windpipe. 34



The windpipe had shifted slightly to the left. On its right side was a small, ragged tear, just below the voice box, and at the same level as the wound on the outside of the neck. The tear on the windpipe was due to a bullet fragment. The bullet had nicked the right side of the windpipe as it tore through his neck. Dr. Perry made a small cut into the windpipe, above the tear, into which a tracheotomy tube was inserted.

The shift of the windpipe to the left, plus the presence of blood and air in the area between and above the lungs and heart, indicated the possibility of a wound to the right lung.

As a preventative measure, a tube in the right chest was requested.

But the amount of blood in the area about the lungs and heart prevented detection of any injuries.


The Original Head Wound.

Parkland doctors stated that the head wound was on the right side - the occipitoparietal area - of the President's skull (Fig. 5-3). Dr. Carrico estimated that between 4-7 cm (1.5-2.7 inches) of scalp and skull were torn away, in approximately a circular shape.

The wound exhibited skull fragments and torn brain tissue, with perhaps about one-third of the brain tissue missing.

Dr. Akin assumed that the wound was tangential. Dr.
Clark described the wound as tangential.

Dr. Clark explained that if a bullet hit the skull at an angle, it would go through more bone than if it hit the head squarely. A tangential path would case the bullet to expend more energy, striking a greater blow to the brain. Not only would pieces of bone be blown into the brain, but the bullet might be "...deflected so that it would go through or penetrate parts of the brain, not in the usual



direct line it was proceeding." 49

Dr. McClelland judged that the wound in the President's skull could be expected "...from a very high velocity missile...with a heavy caliber bullet, such as a .45 pistol fired at close range..." This would particularly apply to the skull "...where there was a sudden change in density from the brain to the skull cavity, as it entered. As it left the body, it would still have a great deal of force behind it and would blow up a large segment of tissue as it exited."

Point of Fntry.

wound on the left side of the President's head. Dr. Jenkins saw blood in the left temporal area, ... right above the zygomatic bone _cheek bong_7 in the hairline... Dr.

McClelland recorded in his medical report on the day of the assassination: "... cause of death was due to massive head and brain injury from a gunshot wound of the left temple." Oscar L. Huber, one of the priests who gave final rites, claimed he saw a wound over the left eye of the President. At the Parkland news conference on the afternoon of November 22nd, "Dr. Perry said the entrance wound - which is the medical description - the entrance wound was in the front of the head."

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Press Conference.

At 1:47 p.m., CST, NBC reported, "President Kennedy, we are now informed, was shot in the right temple. 'It was a simple matter of a bullet right through the head,' said Dr. George Burkley, the White House medical officer."

No mention was made of the wound in the throat. Then, the Parkland doctors held a news conference at 2 p.m.

Parkland doctors had acquired considerable experience 56 They originally speculated that a bullet entered the neck, struck the spinal column, and exited from the head.

Shortly after 2 p.m., the Associated Press quoted Dr.

Perry as saying that the President had been shot "in the front of the head."

At 2:36 p.m., NBC reported from Parkland that doctors Perry and Clark said the President was struck by a bullet "...in front as he faced the assailant

..." CBS reported that Parkland doctors stated that the shots that killed the President had "entered the throat and out the back of the head." 60

The Secret Service was supposed to furnish the Warren Commission with media recordings of the press conference. 61 It never did. Furthermore, according to the National Archives. "No tape recordings or transcripts of the interviews with doctors at Parkland Memorial Hospital, Dallas, Texas, have been found in the Commission's records."

Parkland, which was handwritten, was given to the Secret Service in November 1963. In February 1964, Parkland doctors were interviewed by the Secret Service to determine if they had any other notes or reports. They were interviewed two-to-three times. Of special concern to the Secret Service was whether the neck wound was one of entrance. the doctors speculations on the source of the wounds, and if the doctors had any more written records or information beyond what they had provided.

Burkley.

Naval Adm. Burkley, the President's physician as of
August 1963, was present during efforts to aid the President
at Parkland. but apparently did not participate.

Burkley claimed, "...my direct services...would have interferred with the action of the team which was in progress."

After efforts had failed. Burkley acted to make sure that a Parkland doctor signed a death certificate, which was necessary to remove the body out of state.

Burkley was most insistent on leaving Parkland Hospital
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as soon as possible. He talked to the Dallas County
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Medical Examiner. ...in a very agitated manner, about
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...the necessity of quick action. The latter wanted to hold the body for an autopsy.

The Body Snatchers.

It was essential to the plot that the body of President Kennedy be taken away from the Texas medical authorities lest an honest autopsy reveal that the cause of death was close-range pistol fire - that the wounds of entrance on the front of the body would point to the actual assassin.

From his command post in Parkland's minor medicine suite, the new President issued his first orders. They "... covered two basic points — that President Kennedy's body was to be removed from the hospital forthwith, and the other 76 was that the Vice President was to return to Washington."

According to the hospital administrator. "...a Secret
Service man came to me and asked how we could move the president's body. He asked me if we had a casket, a basket or
anything that we could get to move the body immediately."

But the Dallas County Medical Fxaminer, Dr. Farl Rose, announced. "There has been a homicide here. You won't be

able to remove the body. We will take it down to the mortu78

Ary for an autopsy.* Rose told the Secret Service agents,
who were advancing with the casket, that the chain-of-custody
must be unbroken. Texas law prohibited removal of a body
from the state without an autopsy.

The Secret Service had to retain the evidence. And a power struggle developed in the halls of Parkland Hospital between Secret Service agent Roy Kellerman and Dr. Rose.

No one with sufficient legal authority to settle the dispute could be located. Chief Curry, who had such authority.

could not act. He had been sent by the Secret Service to lead the Vice-President's motorcade back to Love Field and the Presidential plane.

During an interview, Curry commented: "I wasn't there at the time and had I been there I probably would have had to have been on the side of the Coroner because under the Texas law he was supposed to stay there for an autopsy...and they the Secret Service? more or less just mnatched the body away from him..."

Wounded Agent Ploy.

A rumor permitted the body of the President to be removed under the facade of legality and provide the Secret Service with a valid reason to become involved in the investigation. In 1963, the murder of a President was not covered by federal law. If a federal agent, however, was killed, then federal authorities could intervene.

83 Such an agent was fictitiously slain to provide a legal cover to remove the President's body from the jurisdiction of the Dallas Coroner and the state of Texas.

At 12:45 p.m., CBS affiliate KRLD reported that a

Secret Service agent had been killed with the President.

At 1:23 p.m., Walter Cronkite announced on CBS, "A Secret Serviceman was also killed in the fusillade of shots..."

The rumor was heard by a reporter at Parkland Hospital.

At 2:14 p.m., the Associated Press stated, "A Secret Service agent and a Dallas policeman were shot and killed today

"A Dallas Police Dept. officer called his dispatcher at 2:40 p.m., and reported, "One of the Secret Service men on the field -- Flm and Houston; said that it came over his teletype that one of the Secret Service men had been killed."

Reporters went to the Secret Service headquarters in Dallas where a spokesman said he could neither confirm nor deny the report. "All I've heard," he told them, "is the same reports you've heard."

At 3:33 p.m., a denial was issued in Washington, D.C., by Robert Wallace, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury in charge of the Secret Service. Wallace asserted, "No Secret Service man was injured in the attack on President Kennedy."

By that time, the ploy had served its purpose: the body was on its way to Bethesda Naval Hospital in Washington, D.C.

Altering the Limousine.

James J. Rowley, Chief of the Secret Service, asserted:
"...Kellerman authorized the return of the President's car

to the airport for loading aboard a C-130 for the return to Washington, D.C. The purpose was to preserve its condition unchanged for the earliest possible examination.*91

The Secret Service, however, changed the condition of this piece of prime evidence because the limousine was the crime scene itself.

At Parkland Hospital, a Secret Service agent with the Vice-President's detail ordered other agents to put the top on the limousine; 22 two agents did so. This way, no one could see inside the vehicle.

A hospital orderly was asked to get a burket of water;

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he complied. A nurse's aide was asked if she "...would

get someone to come and wash the blood out of the car."

She said she would, but was so excited and nervous she for
got about 1t.

Newsmen were witnesses. Reporter Hugh Sidey watched.

"A guard," he said, "was set up around the Lincoln as Secret Service men got a pail of water and tried to wash the blood from the car."

According to Tom Wicker, "...the police were guarding the Presidential car closely. A bucket of water stood by the car, suggesting that the back seat had been scrubbed out."

On ABC, Don Gardner stated, "Outside the hospital, blood had to be wiped from the limousine..."

Later, the Secret Service admitted it "...was sorry that hospital orderlies had sponged it out." 100

After the limousine had been cleaned out, driven to Love Field, loaded on a military cargo aircraft, flown to Andrews Air Force Base, driven by agents to the White House garage and stored, bullet fragments mysteriously appeared. There was a bullet nose on Greer's seat and a bullet base on the floor by Kellerman's seat. The next morning, the Secret Service allowed the FBI crime lab team to examine the limousine.

Kellerman told another Secret Service agent to take the limousine and the follow-up car back to Love Field and load them aboard the C-130 transport plane. 102

At 1:09 p.m., just a few minutes after the Parkland doctors discontinued treatment of the President, the Dallas police radio received reports about the two cars. A Dallas motorcycle officer radioed his dispatcher: "I have the 2 Presidents cars out there Love Field." 103

Reaching Love Pield, the agents embellished their activities to impress officials there. They "...fanned out crying to everyone they recognized that they would have given anything 'to have been able to shoot it out with that son of hell'; that 'he should be torn limb from limb; death is too good for him.'" No one, however, had been arrested at this time.

Such behavior, in addition to the cover stories, gave the Secret Service enough time to deal with the evidence before an investigation could be started.

carrying the Presidential limousine and the Secret Service follow-up car taxied down the runway for Washington,

D.C.

The Conspiracy Rumor.

While the President's body lay in trauma room one, the Vice-President's party gathered in booth 13 of minor medicine to await medical word of Kennedy's death. At approximately 1:13 p.m., a Secret Service agent entered and told Johnson that the Presidency was his.

At this time, Johnson planted a rumor to distract those who might be in a position to stop the plot. The rumor was effective because its source was authoritative and from the highest level of government, the new President.

One of the first to hear this rumor at Parkland was Presidential aide Kenneth O'Donnell. When he told Johnson that President Kennedy was dead, Johnson said, "...we must look upon this in a sense that it might be a conspiracy of some nature..."

An assistant press secretary asked if he could announce the death of President Kennedy. Johnson said no, end cautioned, "I think we had better wait a few minutes. I think I had better get out of here and get back to the plane before you announce it. We don't know whether they are after me as well as they were after President Kennedy, or whether

they are after Speaker McCormack or Senator Hayden. 109

Johnson made reference to the Lincoln assassination and the attempt to kill Secretary Seward.

"...we don't know," Johnson asserted, "whether this is a world-wide conspiracy."

Later he recalled, "I entertained grave fears for our future. I didn't know if this was part of a communist conspiracy or a plot against our 112 system."

The Secret Service agent in charge of the Vice-President's detail added to the rumor: "We should evacuate this hospital right away." he advocated. The agent urged, "Get on that plane and get back to Washington. We don't know whether this is one man, two men, a gang, or an Army." 113

The Secret Service agent second-in-command under agent Kellerman declared he "...had a hunch that there might be a conspiracy to wipe out all top federal officials."

Dallas Police Chief Curry heard the rumor when he took Jehnson back to Love Field. In an interview, Curry stated:

It was some of the Secret Service men that were with the President at the time. They seemed pretty anxious to get Johnson out of Parkland and get him to Love Field and get him back to Washington. 'Cause something was said, 'we don't know what the hell might be going on, whether this is maybe a international incident or whether this is a civil uprising or what it might be - a revolution. /115

Meanwhile, the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, who was tending the Kennedy Cabinet in a plane over the Pacific Ocean, also planted the rumor. He talked to the Acting Secretary of State, George Ball, by radiophone "... about the possibility that the shooting might be the prelude to some sort of global Pearl Harbor..." Ball then called the CIA Director, John McCone, and advised, "You'd better get the watch committee going..." to survey what Moscow and Peking 117 were doing.

Then, at 1:15 p.m., CST, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 118 broadcast an alert to all U.S. world commands. Wells Hagen, an NBC correspondent, reported from Germany, "... because of the fear of possible invasion, an alert condition - the highest emergency short of war - has been proclaimed in 119 West Germany."

During the flight from Dallas to Washington, Johnson continued his concern about a communist conspiracy. "It's the Kremlin that worries me," he said. "It can't be allowed 120 to detect a waver or a hint of hesitancy."

At the same time, other passengers on the plane heard a different story. During the flight between Dallas and Washington, D.C., - between 2:49 and 5:05 p.m., CST - "... the party learned that there was no conspiracy; learned of the 120-0 identity of Oswald and his arrest..." Oswald was singled-out at this time when no credible evidence existed against him and while other individuals were being interrogated and arrested by police. Indeed, it was not until 1:35 a.m., on the next day, that Oswald was charged with 120-1 assassinating President Kennedy.

On the evening of November 22nd, Dallas District Attorney Henry Wade learned that someone was "... going to file on Oswald as /being/ part of an international conspiracy in mur-

dering the U.S. President..." Though he claimed "...I don't know who suggested it..." he thought "...it had to be a publicity deal...somebody was interested in something other than the law because there is no such charge in Texas 120-b ..." Wade "...went down to the police station and took the charge on him /Oswald/, just a case of simple murder /of 120-c the President/." Wade noted that the U.S. Attorney, Barefoot Sanders - a Johnson appointee - was not "...real 120-d conversant...with what the law is in a murder charge."

Within 24 hours after the assassination, the rumor was 120-2 discredited by Dean Rusk. By that time, it had served its purpose, and the crime had been solved with the jailing of a single malcontent.

For the plot to succeed, the government had to be seized quickly. The rumor aided this. Johnson later tried to explain his rush to assume the office of the Presidency:

"...I knew it was imperative that I grasp the reins of power and do so without delay. Any hesitation or wavering, any false step, any sign of self-doubt, could have been disas
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trous."

Connally's Wounds.

As he faced the President to his rear (Fig. 5-4), a bullet hit the back of Connally's right shoulder, at an angle.

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causing a long, vertical, oval-shaped wound. It then

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struck his fifth rib. leaving some metal in his chest,

and exited below his right nipple, resulting in a horizontal

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oval-shaped wound. What remained of the bullet, with its

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reduced energy, hit the back of his right forearm,

which was directly next to his chest. This further broke up

what was left of the bullet, depositing fragments in the

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wound. In a slanting course, only a small portion of

the bullet exited from the edge of his palm. What fragment remained was deflected into his thigh.


Clothing Alterations.

Connally's clothes would indicate the wounds and bullets. Before the FBI could examine them, his clothes were "...cleaned and pressed."

Furthermore, the FBI was unable to obtain the clothes until April 1964.

The sum over four months after the murder.

The cloth about the holes in the coat, shirt, and toursers lacked any trace of metal. Which made it impossible to determine if a bullet had even gone through 136 them. If Connally was within 18 inches of the gun muzzle, powder residues at that distance would show up during an 137 clean-



ing would remove them.

Other discrepancies appeared when the wounds in Connally's body were compared with the holes in his clothes.

The FBI reported that the hold in the back of the coat

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was elongated horizontally. A Parkland Hospital doctor
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said that the back wound was elongated vertically. While
the FBI stated that the hole in the right sleeve was elongated
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horizontally. the wound in the forearm was elongated
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vertically.

Although holes in the coat corresponded with holes in 142
the shirt, because of "... excessive tearing of the cloth, 143
none of these holes /In the shirt/ were well defined."

In short, not only was the clothing cleaned, but the holes were altered sufficiently to defy analysis (Fig. 5-5).

Who got the cloting? A high-ranking aide of Lyndon

Johnson, Clifton C. Carter received the clothing from a

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Parkland Hospital nurse. Carter signed a slip for the

clothing, received the garments in two paper bags, and pas
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
sed the bags on to Congressman Henry B. Gonzalez. The

next day, Nov. 23, 1963, at 3:30 a.m., the bags were in the

apartment closet of Gonzalez in Washington, D.C.

At Parkland Hospital, the clothing was divided into two groups. One group - tie, trousers, and socks - was given to 147.

Connally's wife when Connally underwent surgery. The second group, which contained the key evidence: the coat and shirt, was elsewhere.



Connally's wife claimed that the coat and shirt were
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finally found in the closet of Congressman Gonzalez. According to Gonzalez, two Secret Service agents picked-up the
clothing "... more than two weeks after the assassination
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..." In addition, Connally's wife said, "... it was almost two months before any of the investigators showed any
interest in examining John's clothing." She asserted
that she soaked the shirt in cold water in order to preserve
151
it. Cold water will remove blood stains from clothing.

The coat and trousers, as photographed by the FBI, show 152 a cleaned and pressed appearance (Fig. 5-5). Their unrumpled condition is unlikely after storage in paper bags.

The coat, rather than preserved as evidence, was chalked and worn by Connally's stand-in during a Commission re153
enactment on May 24, 1964.

Parkland doctors examined the clothing for the first 154 time in April 1964, when they testified before the Warren Commission, four months after the assassination.

Connally in Security.

On Nov. 22, 1963, Connally's aide hinted at the truth.

At a Parkland Hospital press conference, shortly after the shooting, his aide reported Connally said, "I think they 155 shot me in the back. "They got the President too." And elaborate security precautions were taken.

At 4 p.m., of the same day, about two hours after the scapegoat had been seized, Texas Highway Patrol and Rangers

moved in "...tightly securring \(\sic^7 \) the second floor where the Governor was being treated." Locks were changed on the doors of the suite of rooms occupied by Connally and his \(\frac{157}{157} \) staff. The keys were given to Connally's family.

On November 24th, the hospital administrator, a colonel and a sergeant major with the Texas Dept. of Public Safety, and a sergeat with the Texas Rangers decided to move Connally into room 224 of Parkland. Fntry could only be made 160 via room 222. A spotlight was placed "...on the roof outside of rooms 223 and 225." and special window coverings were prepared "...for the Governor's room and the adjoining room."

A list of hospital employees was given to Highway Patrolmen.

The day after the scapegoat was murdered, Nov. 25, 1963, 20 Highway Patrolmen were brought to Parkland from Tyler, Tex. Some were stationed with rifles on the roof of the hospital.

The intent of these security measures was spelled-out by a colonel with the Texas Dept. of Public Safety. He said that no one could see Connally without clearance "...and that included the Secret Service..."

Newsmen were allowed to interview Connally on Nov. 27.

1963. but not until they were completely searched. In addition, they "...were asked not to reveal the location of the bed in the room or the other security measures that had 166 been taken." Security arrangements permitted only one

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newsman into the hospital room with Connally; the rest of the press were in an adjoining room and had to ask questions over a telephone hook-up.

It was on November 23rd, when Oswald learned that

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Connally had been shot. While under interrogation, Oswald
169

expressed no animosity toward Connally; he was described
170

by one policeman as showing "genuine concern and surprise"

at the news of Connally's injuries.

During the Christmas holidays, agent Kellerman of the Secret Service visited Connally. He supposedly talked with 171 Connally about his wrist wound. Or, perhaps, an agreement was reached about the "correct" story.

Newcomb/Adams

Chapter Five.

- 1. Flizabeth Cabell, op. cit., v. 7. p. 487.
- 2. This would explain why Burkley was upset when Presidential aides Powers and O'Donnell prevented him from riding in the jump seat of the Secret Service follow-up car immediately behind the Presidential limousine. He felt, "It's not right," asserting, "the President's personal physician should be much closer to him," even to the extent of "...sitting on an agent's lap." (Manchester, op. cit., pp. 149-150 (PB)).
 - 3. Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 26.

Lady Bird Johnson later wrote that a one-time "... shadow walks beside me down the halls of the White House...I wonder what it would have been like if we had entered this life unaccompanied by that shadow?" (Lady Bird Johnson. "A White House Diary, Part II: The Last Years: Doubts and Dilemmas." McCall's, December 1970. p. 110.)

- 4. Youngblood referred to Burkley as Johnson's "...per-sonal physician..." (Youngblood, 20 Years, p. 181.)
 - 5. Curry, op. cit., v. 4, p. 161.
 - 6. Mayo, op. cit., pp. 22, 23.
- 7. Nallia Connally, "Sinca That Day in Dallas," McCall's, August 1964, p. 79.
- 8. Rufus W. Youngblood, "Testimony of Rufus Wayne Youngblood, Special Agent. Secret Service (dated March 9. 1964/." in Hearings, v. 2, p. 149.
 - 9. Manchester, op. cit., p. 193 (PB).
- 10. Youngblood, op. cit., v. 2. p. 151.

 Hurchel D. Jacks, loc. cit.

- 11. Theodore White, op. cit., p. 47 (PB). Knebel, Look, March 10, 1964, pp. 27, 29.
- 12. Manchester, op. cit., p. 202 (PB).
- 13. Ibid.
- 14. Knebel, op. cit., p. 28.

According to Youngblood, Johnson "...instructed me to have everyone around him take notes...He wanted our memories committed to paper while they were fresh." (Youngblood, 20 Years, p. 128.)

- 15. Interview with Stavis Bllis.
- 16. UPI, Four Days, p. 25.
- 17. Bishop, op. cit., pp. 221-222.

Jack Price, "Charles J. Price Fxhibit No. 33. 'State-ment dated Nov. 27, 1963, 1:52 p.m.7. " in Hearings, v. 21, p. 261.

- 18. Hurchel D. Jacks, loc. cit.
- 19. Milton T. Wright, "Commission Exhibit No. 1024.

 *Statement of Milton T. Wright, Texas Highway Patrolman,
 made on November 28, 1963. within Letter..." in Hearings.
 v. 18, p. 802.

- 20. Charles D. Gerloff, "Price Exhibit No. 29.' Statement dated Nov. 28, 19637, " in Hearings, v. 21, p. 237.
 - 21. Interview with Stavis Ellis.
- 22. Forrest V. Sorrels rode in the lead car, driven by Chief Curry, to Parkland Hospital.

Within the next hour, Sorrels rushed back to the Plaza. There, he located a witness who claimed to have seen a rifle fired from the depository. He also found amateur photographer Abraham Zapruder and offered to take both him and his film to a lab.

In February 1964, when the FBI was trying to locate photographs of the President's body at Parkland, they interviewed Sorrels. Sorrels told FBI agent Alfred D. Neeley that no pictures were taken of the President at Parkland. Sorrels also asserted, "...he remained at the hospital until the President's body was taken to Love Field." (Commission Document No. 735, p. 12.) The president's body left Parkland at 2:04. During much of this time, Sorrels was in another part of Dallas finding witnesses and collecting evidence (Sorrels, op. cit., v. 7, p. 347.).

A photo by News photographer William Allen shows Sorrels in Dealey Plaza with the clock on top of the Depository reading 12:40.

23. Charles J. Carrico, "Testimony of Dr. Charles James Carrico (dated March 30, 1964)," in Hearings, v. 3, p. 361.

"Testimony of Dr. Charles J. Carrico (dated March 25, 1964)," in Hearings, v. 6, p. 3.

"Commission Exhibit No. 392. 'Parkland Memorial Hospital Admission Note (dated Nov. 22, 1963, 4:20 p.m.), within Medical reports from doctors at Parkland Hospital, Dallas, Texas concerning treatment of President Kennedy at that hospital on November 22, 1963," in Hearings, v. 17, p. 4.

Malcolm O. Perry, "Testimony of Dr. Malcolm Perry [dated March 30, 1964]," in Hearings, v. 3, pp. 368, 369.

March 25, 1964, "Testimony of Dr. Malcolm Oliver Perry / dated in Hearings, v. 6, pp. 9, 15, 16.

Hospital Admission Note / dated Nov. 22, 1963, within Medical reports..." in Hearings, v. 17, p. 6.

Charles R. Baxter, "Testimony of Charles Rufus Baxter / dated March 24, 19647," in Hearings, v. 6, p. 42.
______, "Commission Exhibit No. 392. 'Parkland Memorial Hospital Admission Note / dated Nov. 22, 19637, 'within Medical reports..." in Hearings, v. 17, p. 8.

Ronald C. Jones, "Testimony of Dr. Ronald Coy Jones [dated March 24, 1964]," in <u>Hearings</u>, v. 6, pp. 53, 54, 55. 23. (Continued). Margaret M. Henchliffe. "Testimony of Margaret M. Henchliffe /dated March 21. 1964/," in Hearings, v. 6, p. 141.

Dr. Baxter placed it at about 12 inches (3.84 cm) above the notch of the breastbone (Baxter, op. cit., v. 6, p. 42.).

24. James J. Humes, "Testimony of Comdr. James J. Humes /dated March 16, 1964/," in Hearings, v. 2, p. 362.

Humes notes of his conversation with Perry reflect: "only a few mm in size 3-5 mm." (v. 17, p. 29.)

In size, estimates ranged from 4-8 mm (0.15-0.32 inches) in diameter.

Carrico, op. cit., v. 3, p. 361: 5-8 mm, v.6, p.3: 4-7 mm. Perry, op. cit., v. 3, pp. 368, 372, 374; v. 6, p. 9: 5 mm (Note: in v. 6, p. 15, is the typographic error of 3-5 cm.).

Baxter, loc. cit: 4-5 mm.

Jones, op. cit., v. 6. pp. 53. 54: 1 of an inch or
6.25 mm.

25. Carrico, op. cit., v. 3, p. 362: "...fairly round..."

Ibid: "...an even round wound."

Ibid., v. 6, p. 3: "...rather round..."

Perry, op. cit., v. 3, pp. 368, 374: "...roughly circular wound..."

<u>Ibid.</u>, v. 6, pp. 9, 15: "...roughly spherical to oval in shape..."

Baxter, op. cit., v. 6, p. 42: "...a spherical

Henchliffe, op. cit., v. 6, p. 141: "...just a little round hole..."

26. Carrico, op. cit., v. 3, p. 362: "...had no ragged edges..."

Ibid., v. 6, p. 3: "...no jagged edges..."

Perry, op. cit., v. 3, pp. 372, 388; v. 6, p. 9: "... edges were neither ragged nor were they punched out, but rather clean."

Ibid., v. 6, p. 15: "...not unlike a rather large
puncture wound..."

Jones, op. cit., v. 6, pp. 54, 55: "...relatively smooth edges..." "...relatively clean cut..."

Henchliffe, op. cit., v. 6, p. 141: "...jegged a little bit."

- 27. Carrico, op. cit., v. 3, p. 362.

 Jones, op. cit., v. 6, p. 54.

 Gene C. Akin, "Testimony of Dr. Gene Coleman Akin

 [dated March 25, 1964]," in Hearings, v. 6, p. 65.
- 28. Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, TM 8-300, NAVMED P-5065, AFM 160-19, Autopsy Manual, p. 60.
 - 29. Jones, op. cit., v. 6, p. 54.
 - 30. Akin, loc. cit.
 - 31. Ibid.
- 32. Perry. op. cit. v. 3. pp. 368, 372, 388; v. 6, pp. 9, 16; v. 17, p. 6.
- 33. Ibid., v. 3. pp. 369, 380; v. 6, p. 16.
- 16. Baxter, op. cit., v. 3, pp. 369, 380; v. 6, pp. 10,

Perry told reporter Jimmy Breslin that "The incision had to be made below the bullet wound." (Los Angeles Times, Nov. 24, 1963, Sect. B, pp. 1, 7.)

- 35. Perry, op. cit., v. 3. p. 370; v. 6. p. 10.

 Robert N. McClelland, "Testimony of Dr. Robert Nelson

 McClelland /dated March 21, 19647." in Hearings, v. 6, p. 33.

 Baxter, loc. cit.
- 36. Perry, op. cit., v. 3, pp. 370, 374, 376; v. 6, p. 10; v. 17, p. 6. Carrico, op. cit., v. 6, p. 3; v. 17, p. 4.
- 37. McClelland, op. cit., v. 6, p. 33.

 "Commission Exhibit No. 392. Parkland Memorial Hospital Admission Note Zdated Nov. 22, 1963, 4:45 p.m./."
 within Medical reports..." in Hearings, v. 17, p. 11.
 - 38. Perry, op. cit., v. 3, p. 370; v. 6, p. 10. Baxter, loc. cit.

39. Perry. op. cit., v. 3. p. 371; v. 6, p. 10.

William K. Clark, "Testimony of Dr. Kemp Clark Resumed /dated March 25, 1964/," in Hearings, v. 6, p. 28.

Marion T. Jenkins, "Testimony of Dr. Marion Thomas Jenkins Zdated March 25, 1964," in Hearings, v. 6, p. 51.

Perry told reporter Jimmy Breslin that "There was a mediastinal wound...in connection with the bullet hole in the chest." (Los Angeles Times, Nov. 24, 1963. pp. 1. 7.) When this story was printed in December, it read. "There was a mediastinal wound in connection with the bullet hole in the throat." (Saturday Evening Post, Dec. 14, 1963. p. 30.)

Dr. Clark stated. "...one /bullet/ struck him at about the necktie knot. 'It ranged downward in his chest and did not exit." (New York Times, Nov. 27, 1963, p. 20.)

40. Clark, op. cit., v. 6, p. 28.

41. Perry, op. cit., v. 3, p. 371: v. 6, p. 11.

42. Carrico, op. cit., v. 6, p. 6: "...right occipito-parietal..." v. 3, p. 361: "...posterior skull, the occipital region..."

Perry, op. cit., v. 6, p. 9: "...right posterior parietal area..." v. 6, p. 11: "...right occipitoparietal area..." v. 3, p. 368 and v. 17, p. 6: "...right posterior cranium..." v. 3, p. 372: "...right parietal occipital area..."

Clark, op. cit., v. 6, p. 20: "...right posterior part..." v. 6, p. 29: "...right occipital region..." v. 17. p. 3: "right occipital region..." v. 17. p. 10: "...right occiput extending to the parietal region."

McClelland, op. cit., v. 6, p. 33: "...right posterior portion..."

Jones, op. cit., v. 6, p. 53: "...right posterior side."

Akin, op. cit., v. 6, pp. 65, 67: "...right occipital parietal..."

Paul C. Peters, "Testinony of Dr. Paul Conrad Peters / dated March 24, 1964/." in Hearings, v. 6, p. 71: "... right occipital parietal area..."

Some of the physicians included the temporal bone in the area of damage.

Baxter, op. cit., v. 6, p. 41: "...temporal parietal bones were missing..." v. 17, p. 8: "...right temporal and occipital bones were missing..."

Kenneth F. Salyer, "Testimony of Dr. Kenneth Fverett Salyer /dated March 25, 19647," in Hearings, v. 6, p. 81:
"...right temporal area..."

Jenkins, op. cit., v. 17, p. 15: "...temporal and occipital..."

Dr. McClelland observed that the right, rear half of the parietal bone and some of the right side of the occipital bone seemed to be fractured (McClelland, op. cit. v. 6, p. 33.).

43. Carrico. op. cit., v. 6, pp. 3, 6.

Note: in v. 3. p. 361, is the typographic error of 5-71 cm.

44. <u>Ibid</u>.

Jones, op. cit., v. 6, p. 53.

Don T. Curtis, "Testimony of Dr. Don Tell Curtis

[dated March 24, 19647," in <u>Hearings</u>, v. 6, p. 60.

Akin, op. cit., v. 6, p. 66.

45. Both cerebral and cerebellar brain tissue.

Carrico, op. cit., v. 6, p. 6. Clark, op. cit., v. 6, p. 20. McClelland, op. cit., v. 6, p. 33.

46. McClelland, loc. cit. The torn venous channels accounted for much of the heavy bleeding.

- 47. Akin, op. cit., v. 6, p. 67.
- 48. Clark, op. cit., v. 6, p. 21.
- 49. Ibid.
- 50. McClelland, op. cit., v. 6, p. 38.
- 51. Jenkins, op. cit., v. 6, pp. 48, 51.
- 52. McClelland, op. cit., v. 17. p. 12.
- 53. Philadelphia Sunday Bulletin, Nov. 24, 1963.
- 54. WOR Radio, Nov. 22, 1963, 2:43 p.m. CST.
- 55. Chet Huntley, NBC News, 1:47 p.m., CST.
- 56. Carrico, op. cit., v. 3, p. 358; v. 6, p. 5.

 Perry, op. cit., v. 3, p. 366; v. 6, p. 18.

 McClelland, op. cit., v. 6, p. 31.

 Baxter, op. cit., v. 6, p. 43.

 Jenkins, op. cit., v. 6, p. 50.

 Jones, op. cit., v. 6, p. 55.

 Akin, op. cit., v. 6, p. 65.
 - 57. Perry, op. cit., v. 6, p. 13.
 McClelland, op. cit., v. 6, pp. 35. 37.
 Jones, op. cit., v. 6, p. 56.
 Peters, op. cit., v. 6, p. 71.
 - 58. Manchester, op. cit., p. 403 (PB).
 - 59. NBC Log. Nov. 22, 1963, p. 8, 2:36 p.m., CST.

- 60. Robert Pierpoint, CBS News, 6:15 p.m., CST.
- 61. Perry, op. cit., v. 3. p. 378.
- 62. Mark Fckhoff, Letter to Fred T. Newcomb, dated Aug. 3, 1970.
- 63. New York Times, Nov. 27, 1963, p. 20.
- 64. Commission Document No. 379.
- 65. Carrico, op: c1t., v. 3, p. 363; v. 6, p. 6.

 Perry, op. c1t., v. 6, p. 17.

 Clark, op. c1t., v. 6, p. 27.

 Jones, op. c1t., v. 6, p. 57.
- 66. Carrico, op. cit., v. 3, p. 364.
- 67. Perry, op. cit., v. 3. p. 387. Carrico, op. cit., v. 6, p. 7.
- 68. Carrico, op. cit., v. 6, p. 7. Clark, op. cit., v. 6, p. 27. Baxter, op. cit., v. 6, p. 44. Jenkins, op. cit., v. 6, pp. 50, 51. Jones, op. cit., v. 6, p. 57. Bashour, op. cit., v. 6, p. 63. Giesecke, op. cit., v. 6, p. 75.
- 69. Carrico, op. cit. 7 2. 363.

70. Only one doctor indicated that Burkley asked that the President be given steriods (Peters, or. cit., v. 6, p. 69.). The other doctors said that the President's adrenal insufficiency was common knowledge; no one was consulted on the scene (Carrico, or. cit., v. 3, p. 361; Perry, or. cit., v. 3. pp. 370, 377; Jones, op. cit., v. 6, p. 55.). Burkley stated he gave Parkland doctors information about the President's blood group (George G. Burkley, "Commission Fxhibit No. 1126. 'Statement dated November 27, 1963, of Dr. George G. Burkley, physician to the President," in Hearings. v. 22, p. 94.). No doctor confirmed this.

71. George G. Burkley, "Commission Exhibit No. 1126.

'Statement dated November 27, 1963, of Dr. George G. Burkley, physician to the President.'" in Hearings, v. 22, p. 94.

Note: In the official report of medical efforts at Parkland in the Texas State Journal of Medicine (v. 60, Jan. 1964, pp. 61-65) Burkley was not mentioned.

Burkley also failed to provide "direct services" on an earlier occasion for the President. In the fall of 1962, after the President's father had suffered a seizure, "the President told the Admiral /Burkley/ to stay with his father..." Instead, Burkley left, supposedly to see about emergency supplies. The President "...was furious that the Admiral had left even for a moment," and instructed an agent to tell Burkley "...that I said he's to sit with my dad all the time...until the other doctors get here." (Rita Dallas, "The Kennedy Case," pt. 2, McCall's, June 1973, p. 128.)

72. Clark, op. cit., v. 6, pp. 25, 30.

- 73. Burkley, op. cit., v. 22, p. 95.
- 74. 0'Donnell. op. cit., v. 7. p. 452.
- 75. Burkley, loc. cit.
- 76. 0'Brien. op. cit., v. 7. p. 468.
 77. Charles J. Price, "Price Exhibit No. 33..." op. cit.,
 v. 21. p. 260.
 - 78. Bishop, op. cit., p. 220.
 - 79. Interview with Jesse F. Curry.
 - 80. Manchester, op. cit., pp. 338-346 (PB).
 - 81. Curry. loc. cit.
 - 82. Ibid.

Later, Secret Service Chief Howley explained to the Warren Commission, "Special Agent Lawson, through Doctor Burkley, arranged with Sheriff William Decker for the release of President Kennedy's body." (James J. Rowley, "Commission Exhibit No. 1026. Secret Service memorandum, dated March 19, 1964, re 'Secret Service Report on the Assassingtion of President Kennedy,'" in Hearings, v. 18, p. 814.)

- 83. 18 U.S.C. 1114. Manchester, op. cit., p. 313 (PB).
- 84. CBS, Nov. 22, 1963, 12:45 CST.
- 85. CBS, Nov. 22, 1963, 1:23 p.m. CST.
- 86. Seth Kantor, "Kantor Fxhibit No. 4..." in Hearings, v. 20, p. 410.
 - 87. Manchester, op. cit., p. 192 (PB).
- 88. Dallas Police Dept., "Commission Fxhibit No. 705.
 'Channel 2' with Hadio logs for Nov. 22, 1963 [dated March 23, 1964]," in Hearings, v. 17. p. 479.
 - 89. Dallas Times Herald, Nov. 22, 1963, p. 1.
 - 90. NBC News. Nov. 22, 1963, 3:40 p.m.
 - 91. Commission Document No. 677, p. 2.

- 92. Manchester, op. cit., p. 205 (PB).
- 93. Samuel A. Kinney. "Commission Fxhibit No. 1024. Statement dated Nov. 22, 19637." within Letter..." in Hearings. v. 18. p. 732.

George W. Hickey, Jr., "Commission Exhibit No. 1024.
'Activities of S.A. George W. Hickey, Jr. from the time he arrived at Love Airfield, Dallas, Texas, Thursday, November 21, 1963, to the time he departed from the above Love Airfield, Priday, November 22, 1963 / dated Nov. 30, 19637." within Letter..." in Hearings, v. 18, p. 763.

Note: According to a photograph, Kinney had help from a Dallas Police Dept. officer in placing the top on the limousine (Jesse F. Curry JFK Assassination File, p. 36.)

- 94. Joe L. Richards, "Price Exhibit No. 27, 'Activities of Joe Lewis Richards, orderly, on Nov. 22, 1963,'" in Hearings, v. 21, p. 226.
- 95. Shirley Randall, "Price Fxhibit No. 22. 'Activities of Shirley Randall, aide on November 22, 1963,'" in Hearings, v. 21, p. 217.
 - 96. Ibid.
 - 97. "The Assassination," Time. Nov. 29, 1963, p. 24.
 - 98. New York Times, Nov. 23, 1963. p. 2.
- 99. ABC, "The Day the President Was Shot," broadcast on Nov. 22, 1963, a network special with newsman Don Gardner.
- 100. Bishop, op. cit., p. 352.
- 101. Robert A. Frazier, "Testimony of Robert A. Frazier [dated May 13, 1964]," in Hearings, v. 5, p. 71.
- 102. Kellerman, op. cit., v. 18. p. 726.

Agents Kinney. Hickey and Howlett were enroute to the airport (George W. Hickey, Jr., op. cit., v. 18. p. 764; John J. Howlett, "Commission Exhibit No. 1024. 'Statement dated Nov. 22, 1963/, within Letter...in Hearings, v. 18. pp. 793-794.). Hickey drove the limousine with Howlett next to him in the front seat; Kinney steered the follow-up car (Ibid.).

- 103. Commission Schible: No. 1974. "FBI report dated Aug. 11, 1964 at Dallas, Tex., of transcripts of Dallas police radio transmissions covering period of Nov. 22-24, 1963 (CD 1420)." in Hearings, v. 23, p. 919.
- 104. Manchester, op. cit., p. 303 (PB).

105. Dallas Police Dept., "Commission "xhibit wo. 705. Channel 2," op. cit., v. 17, p. 485.

- 106. Samuel A. Kinney, op. cit., v. 18, p. 731.
- 107. Manchester, op. cit., p. 243.
- 108. O'Donnall, op. cit., v. 7. p. 451.
- 109. Nawswack, Jan. 6, 1964, p. 20.
- : 110. Ibid.
- 111. Jim Bishop, "The Day J.F.K. Died," Ladies Home Journal, November 1968, pp. 152-153. This was advertised on the magazine's cover as "...Tells L.B.J.'s Story."
- 112. Hugh Sidey, A Very Personal Presidency, pp. 30-31.
- 113. Knobol, op. cit., p. 28.
- 114. Nayo, op. cit., p. 27.
- 115. Interview with Jesse F. Curry.
- 116. Stewart Alsop, "Johnson Takes Over: the Untold Story," Saturday Evening Post, Feb. 15, 1964, p. 18.
- 117. Hanchester, op. cit., p. 289 (PB).
- 118. Ibid., pp. 220, 761 (PB).
- 119. NBC, There Was A President, p. 30.
- 120. Knabal, op. cit., p. 30.

120-0. Theodore H. White, The Making of the President 1964, p. 48 (PB).

Unknown to Johnson, Kennedy had all conversations taped during flight (Manchester, op. cit., p. 423 (PB)). In 1965, Johnson only allowed Manchester "... to reed an edited transcript of the flight taped at the White Mouse." (Ibid)

White indicated the tape was in the National Archives (White, op. cit., p. 20 (PB)). The Archivist was unable to locate it in 1967 (Robert H. Bahmer, Letter to Vincent J. Selandria, dated Nov. 20, 1967). Pierre Salinger obtained a transcript from the White House Communication Agency and included it in his papers at the Archives (Pierre Salinger, Letter to Vincent J. Salandria, dated Dec. 26,

120-0 (continued): 1967). Again the Archivist was unable to locate it (Robert H. Bahmer, Letter to Vincent J. Salandria, dated Jan. 9, 1968). A letter directed to the White House Communication Agency was answered by Col. James U. Cross, Armed Forces aide to Johnson, who said the tapes were for "...official use only," and could not be released (James U. Cross, Letter to Vincent J. Salandria, dated Jan. 2, 1968). Cross, who piloted Air Force One for five years, was later appointed by Mohnson to be executive director of LBJ State Park in Stonewall, Texas (Los Angeles Times, June 21, 1973, Pt. 1-A, p. 2).

Then, a letter sent to the Archives in 1974 was "...referred to John F. Kennedy Library for reply." (Daniel J. Reed, Letter to Fred T. Kewcomb, dated Dec. 5, 1974).

120-1. "ARGATGNEENT OF OSWALD for John F. Kennedy's murder 11-23-63 at approx. 1:35 am," within Commission within No. 2003. "Dallas Police Dept. file on investigation of the assassination of the President (CD 81b, all pages)." in Hearings, v. 24, p. 232.

120-a. Henry Wade, "Testimony of Henry Wade Zdated June 8, 1964/," in Hearings, v. 5, p. 218.

120-b. Ibid., po. 218-219.

Manchester states Wade's "...second assistant, William F. 'Bill' Alexander, prepared to charge Oswald with murdering the President 'as part of an international communist conspiracy.'" (Manchester, op. cit., p. 287.) Alexander denied this to Wade (Wade, op. cit., v. 5, p. 218.)

Shoriff J.w. Decker felt, "It is not inconceivable that the whole plot could have been hatched in "ussia." (Fimer Gertz, homent of madness; The Feoble vs. Jack Muby, p. 26.)

120-c. Wade, op. cit., v. 5, p. 219.

120-d. Ibid.

According to Manchester, "...when parefoot Sanders heard of it /international conspiracy charge/ from the FBI he phoned wick Katzenbach /Leputy Attorney General/, who persuaded two members of the Vice President's Washin ton staff to have their Texas contacts kill it." (Manchester, op. cit., p. 287.)

120-e. Dean Musk, "Testimony of the Hon. Dean Husk, Secretary of State Zated June 10, 19647," in Hearings, v. 5. ob. 367, 368.

121. Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 18.

122. Robert H. Shaw, "Testimony of Dr. Robert Shaw [dated March 23, 1964]," in hearings, v. 6, p. 95.

Dr. Shew indicated that, given the shape of the entrance wound on the back, the ballet hit Connally at a tangent (Itid.).

123. The wound on the back of Connelly's right shoulder was 2 cm (0.78") from the edge of the shoulder blade, about mid-way from the fold in the armpit/a. In the longest diameter, it was 1.5 cm (0.585") in size/b. It was elliptical in shape, with a long and a short diameter, unlike a puncture wound /c. Dr. Gregory described it as "...sort of a linear wound, perhaps three-quarters of an inch in length /1.92 cm/ with a rounded central portion" /d.

Parkland Memorial Hospital Operative Record Zdated Nov. 22, 1963/. within Redical reports... in Hearings, v. 17. p. 16.

_____, op. cit., v. 6, p. 85.

Connally, op. cit., v. 4, p. 136.

123. (Continued).

VH

b. Shaw, ob. cit., v. 6, pp. 85, 86; pp. 104, 107.

Note: Shaw originally said it was 3 cm (1.17") long)(v. 17, p. 16), but later indicated, "The skin surrounding the wound was removed...enlarging the incision to approximately 3 cm..." (v. 6, p. 88).

- c. Ibid., v. 6, pp. 85, 95; v. 4, pp. 104, 107-108.
- d. Charles F. Gregory, "Testimony of Dr. Charles Francis Gregory /dated March 23, 1964/," in Hearings, v. 6, p. 97.

124. The bullet hit the middle of the fifth rib and followed its downward slant. /a While Connally was seated, during testimony before the Warren Commission, Dr. Shaw used calipers and found the angle from back-to-front to be 25-27 degrees. /b

- a. Shaw, op. cit., v. 6, pp. 85, 86; v. 4, p. 112. b. Connally, op. cit., v. 4, pp. 137, 138.
- 125. Shaw claimed that he saw no metal in the chest during surgery or on x-rays. /a Dr. Shires, however, disagreed. He stated, "...from postoperative X-rays, there is a small fragment remaining /in the chest/..." /b
- a. Shaw, op. cit., v. 4, p. 105.
 b. George T. Shires. "Testimony of Dr. George T.
 Shires / dated March 23, 1964/," in Hearings, v. 6, p. 111.

126. The wound in Connally's chest was 2" (5.12 cm) below and 2" to the left of his right nipple. /a Its size was given as from $1\frac{1}{7}$ " (3.84 cm) /b to 5 cm (1.95") in diameter. /c It appeared to be ragged, and round, or oval in shape. /d

- a. Shaw, op. cit., v. 6, p. 85; v. 4, p. 137.
 Gregory, op. cit., v. 6, p. 97.
 Connally, op. cit., v. 4, p. 136.
 b. Gregory, op. cit., v. 6, p. 97.
- c. Shaw, op. cit., v. 17, p. 16; v. 6, p. 85; v. 4, p. 137.
 d. <u>Ibid</u>., v. 17, p. 16; v. 6, pp. 85, 87; v. 4, p.

127.Dr. Gregory felt that the damage was due to " ... an irregular missile...one that has been distorted (Gregory, op. cit., v. 4, p. 124.). Furthermore, very little energy was spent in creating the wound. (Ibid., v. 4, pp. 128-129).

128. The wound on the back of Connally's forearm was slightly toward the thumb side from the middle. /a Connally placed it "...an inch /2.56 cm/ above the wrist bone ... " /b Dr. Gregory placed it from 12"-2" (3.84-5.12 cm) to 5 cm (1.95") above the wrist. /c In size, the wound was 2 cm (0.78") to 0.5 by 2.5 cm (0.195 x 0.975") long. /d It appeared ragged, oblique, and linear, with gapping at its upper part. /e

a. Charles F. Gregory, "Commission Fxhibit No. 392. *Parkland Memorial Hospital Operative Record /dated Nov. 22. 19637. within Medical reports... in Hearings, v. 17. p. 18.

Gregory, op. cit., v. 6, pp. 97-98. Shaw, op. cit., v. 6, p. 89; v. 4, p. 108.

b. Connally, op. cit., v. 4, p. 135. c. Gregory, op. cit., v. 6, pp. 97-98; v. 4, pp. 118.

d. Ibid., v. 17, p. 18; v. 6, p. 97; v. 4, p. 124. Ibid., v. 6, p. 97; v. 17, p. 18; v. 4, p. 124. Shaw, op. cit., v. 4, p. 108.

129 Both cloth and metal were in the wound. /a Dr. Gregory said that 2-3 metal fragments were removed. /b They were flake-like, ranging from 0.5-2 mm (0.002-0.08") in diameter, and weighing in micrograms. /c They were silver or lead in color, not copper or brass. /d

> a. Gregory, v. 17. p. 18. op. cit.) Shaw, op. cit., v. 6, p. 95. b. Gregory, ob. cit., v. 6, p. 98.

c. <u>Ibid.</u>, v. 4, p. 120. d. <u>Ibid.</u>, v. 4, p. 122. Note: the planted, scenario bullets were full copper-jacketed, Accord/NGTO FBI LAB REPORT Commission Document No. 5, p. 163:

130. The location of the two forearm wounds indicated a slanting course for the bullet. (Gregory, op. cit., v. 4, p. 120)

131 On the palm side of the forearm, the wound was at the center of the wrist. /a Connally felt it was 0.75-1" (1.92-2.56 cm) from the edge of his palm. /b Dr. Gregory located it 1.52-2cm (0.585-0.78") from the large, heavy crease at the wrist, and in a skin crease. /c Dr. Gregory, in his

131. (Continued). testimony, gave three different dimensions for the wound: 0.5 cm (0.195). /d 1.0 cm (0.39"). /e and 1.5 cm (5.85"). /f It appeared to be a small tear, running crosswise, without gapping. /g

> a. Gregory, op. cit., v. 17, p. 18; v. 4, p. 118. b. Connally, op. cit., v. 4, p. 135.

c. Gregory, or. cit., v. 17, p. 18; v. 6, p. 98; v. 4, pp. 118, 120, 123.

d. Ibid., v. 4, p. 124. e. <u>Ibid</u>. v. 6, p. 98. f. <u>Ibid</u>. v. 4, p. 123. g. <u>Ibid</u>. v. 6, p. 98; v. 4, pp. 123, 124.

132. The thigh wound was 5-6" (12.8-15.38 cm) above the knee. /a Connally believed it was from 0.25-0.33" (0.64-0.846 cm) wide. /b The doctors estimated its size at 6 mm (0.24") to 1 cm (0.39"). /c In shape, Dr. Gregory felt it was "...slmost round..." /d to "...rounded..." /e Dr. Shaw noted it as "...the slit in the skin..." /f It appeared to be a puncture wound. /g

A bullet fragment, which was not removed, was found against the thigh bone. $\frac{h}{1}$ Fstimates gave its size from 0.5 x 2 mm (0.02 x 0.08") $\frac{h}{1}$ to 1 x 2 mm (0.04 x 0.08")./1 and weight of about 0.1 grain. /k

Given the fact that the wound was larger than the fragment, $\frac{1}{m}$ the doctors believed that the wound was tangential. $\frac{1}{m}$

In position, Connally said that his knees might have been 2"-1" higher in the limousine jump seat than they would be sitting in a chair. /n

Dr. Gregory said that "...he removed from the /Governor's arm a small fragment of metal." /o He gave this to Miss Audrey Bell, who, in turn, gave it to Highway Patrolman Bobby M. Nolan. /p Nolan turned it over to Capt. Will Fritz of the Dallas Police Dept. at 7:50 p.m., on Nov. 22. 1963. /q FBI agent Vincent F. Drain obtained it from Fritz and brought it to the FBI laboratory on Nov. 23. 1963. /r The fragment, /s a piece of lead which weighed 0.5 grains. lacked "...any physical characteristics which would permit stating whether or not it actually originated from a bullet."

A postoperative x-ray of Connally's thigh on Nov. 29. 1963, showed the presence of the small fragment. /u A hospital administrator measured the fragment as between 1.3-1.5 mm wide and 2-3.5 mm long. /v

148. Ibid.

149. Henry B. Gonzalez, Letter to Fred T. Newcomb, dated Nov. 15, 1974.

D. 2. Latter to Fred T. Newcomb, dated Nov. 1, 1974,

150. Life, loc. cit.

151. Ibid.

152. "Commission "xhibit No. 683. 'Front view of coat worn by Governor Connally at time of the assassination,'" in Hearings, v. 17, p. 340.

"Commission "xhibit No. 684. Back view of coat worn by Governor Connally at time of the assassination," in Hearings, v. 17, p. 341.

"Commission Txhibit No. 687. 'Front view of pants worn by Governor Connally at the time of the assassination,'" in Hearings, v. 17, p. 344.

153. Thomas J. Kelley, "Testimony of Thomas J. Kelley (dated June 4, 1964)," in Hearings, v. 5. p. 134.

154. Shaw. op. cit., v. 4. p. 112.

"Connally's bullet-torn suit, his necktie, and his shirt with French cuffs were displayed for a time at the state archives in Austin, and the clothing is still there. However, to see them, one must get Connally's personal permission." (Ann F. Crawford and Jack Keever, John B. Connally: Portrait in Power, p. 299.)

- 155. Ronnie Dugger, Texas Observer, Nov. 29, 1963, p. 6.
- 156. O. P. Wright, "Charles J. Price Exhibit no. 29. 'Memo no. 246 dated Dec. 4, 1963, " in Hearings, v. 21, p. 230.
- 157. Steve Landregan, "Charles J. Price exhibit no. 7. 'Statement/." in Hearings, v. 21, p. 168.
- 158. Ibid.
- 159. Ibid., p. 174.
- 160. Ibid., pp. 174-175.
- 161. Ibid., p. 175..
- 162. Ibid.
- 163. Dallas Morning News, Nov. 26, 1963.
- 164. New York Times, Nov. 25, 1963. p. 9.
- 165. Washington Post. Nov. 28, 1963. p. A-8.
- 166. Ibid.
- 167. ABC tv log.
- 168. James W. Bookout, "Testimony of James W. Bookout /dated April 8, 1964/." in Hearings. v. 7. p. 315.
- 169. Harry D. Holmes, "Testimony of Harry D. Holmes dated April 2, 1964/." in Hearings, v. 7, pp. 304-305.
- 170. Charles Ashman, Connally, The Adventures of Big Bad John, p. 43.
- 171. Kallarman, op. cit., v. 2, p. 83.

Chapter 6. Bethesda

The body was aboard and Johnson had been sworn-in as President when the Presidential plane left Dallas for Andrews Air Force Base in Washington, D.C.

But the Parkland doctors press conference, which was heard on the plane, compelled the plotters to make certain decisions. The doctors talked of entrance wounds in the throat and temple. Therefore, the body had to be altered to disprove that, and the assassin's bullets had to be removed. Details had to be considered regarding the clothing, films, and medical documents.

A Naval hospital would offer the best control. given that Burkley was Navy and also held the high rank of Rear Admiral. Under the guise of the need for an autopsy, Burkley spoke to Mrs. Kennedy. He said. "It's going to be necessary to take the President to a hospital...the doctors must remove the bullet." He persuaded her to have the body taken to Bethesda Naval Hospital. Reinforcement of the Bethesda plan was supplied by Capt. R.O. Canada, Jr., who "...had once been George Burkley's shipmate," as well as Lyndon Johnson's doctor.

Canada was the commanding officer of Bethesda and had an ambulance sent to Andrews Air Force base for the body.

The necessary alterations on the body would produce an unwanted side effect: disfigurement of the face. This would later require control of the autopsy pictures, but a more immediate step could be taken. At 3:31 p.m., CST, during the flight, NBC announced that the "casket will be closed at the funeral."

The Kennedy family did not decide on a closed casket until the next day when they saw the body.

Three hours of work by a cosmetician could only produce a face that looked like that of a wax dummy.

Johnson wanted Mrs. Kennedy to change her bloodstained clothes because an immaculate appearance by her. in a photograph of his swearing-in could soften the public's memory of Blm St. Burkley, now Johnson's physician, tried to persuade her. She refused, "No. I want them to see what they've done."

Mrs. Kennedy sat with Presidential Assistant Kenneth P.

O'Donnell in the rear of the plane with the casket.

O'Donnell, familiar with those now in control of the White

House, exclaimed, "They did it. I always knew they'd do it.

You couldn't expect anything else from them. They finally

made it."

After the plane landed, Johnson wanted to leave the plane with the casket and Mrs. Kennedy, but Kennedy aides blocked his way. He was forced to wait and use another

exit.

As Johnson left the plane, the first hand he shook at the bottom of the plane ramp was that of James J. Rowley. Chief of the Secret Service. Rowley motioned him over to a battery of microphones where Johnson made his first public address as President. The Johnson party then left by helicopter to physically occupy the executive offices of the White House.

The Attorney General, Robert F. Kennedy, had sent orders to an arm of the Justice Dept., the FBI. Around 5:55 p.m., agents Sibert and O'Neill of the Hyattsville, Maryland, field office were contacted. They were told to "...accompany the body to the National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, Maryland, to stay with the body and to obtain bullets reportedly in the President's body."

The casket was lowered from the Presidential plane and placed in a Naval ambulance. At 6:10 p.m., EST, it left 18

Andrews in a motorcade for Bethesda.

FBI agents Sibert and O'Neill contacted Chief Rowley at Andrews and told him of their orders. Rowley had the two ride in the third car of the motorcade with other Kennedy 20 loyalists.

Mrs. Kennedy was in the rear of the ambulance. During the ride to Bethesda, she told the Attorney General, in the presence of an Air Force aide, "...the full horror of Dallas."

At 6:55 p.m., 45 minutes later, the motorcade arrived at Bethesda. 22

Alterations.

The President had been shot twice. The first shot entered his throat, grazed the vertebrae just below the base of the neck, and lodged in the body. The second shot entered in the hairline of his left temple and exited from the right, rear side.

Bullets in the head and lower neck were located and removed. A planted bullet "found" at Parkland would be used to explain the absence of bullets in the body.

The task before the plotters was to make "entrance" wounds on the back of the body, and to change the actual entrance wounds at the front to those of "exit." A false "entrance" wound was made at the base of the skull and another in the upper back. The actual entrance wound in the throat was originally to be non-existent; later it was transformed into an "exit" wound for the back. The actual entrance wound in the left temple was enlarged to become non-existent - the bullet hole was cut out. And the actual exit wound on the right, rear side of the head was enlarged to confuse the autopsy doctors at Bethesda.

The body arrived at Bethesda at 6:55 p.m. After 40 minutes, it reached the autopsy room. Signs of alteration were present.

After the alterations had been done, the original wrappings about the body were not replaced. At Parkland, four Newcomb/Adams 197

sheets were wrapped around the head due to the large amount At Bethesda, "...the head area contained an It was also obvious that there additional wrapping ... had been "...surgery...in the top of the skull," when the Consequently, "...portions FBI saw the head (Fig. 6-1). of the skull...came apart in our the Bethesda doctors 7 hands very easily ... " Furthermore, the President's brain was quite easily removed without recourse to cranial surgery, because the top of the skull had been removed prior to autopsy (Fig. 6-4). There was bruising above the right eye. Yet Kellerman testified that the President had no visible injuries on his face at Parkland Hospital: The drawing of the President's face prepared according to the Bethesda doctors' instructions indicates damage to the right eye (Fig. 6-5)

Throat.

By comparing the wound's appearance at Parkland with its appearance at Bethesda, the alteration becomes obvious.

Instead of a cut of a few millimeters across the neck wound as done by Dr. Perry at Parkland Hospital. "...a 6.5 cm 2.5 inches long transverse wound with widely gaping irregular edges" was displayed at Bethesda (Fig.6-2).

Cmdr. James J. Humes, one of the three physicians who performed the autopsy, later testified that the length of the cut as seen at Bethesda was "...some 7 or 8 cm 2.7-3.1 inches34

The President's body was removed from the casket in which it had been transported and was placed on the autopsy table, at which time the complete body was wrapped in a sheet and the head area contained an additional wrapping which was saturated with blood. Following the removel of the wrapping, it was ascertained that the President's clothing had been removed and it was also apparent that a tracheotomy had been performed, as well as surgery of the head area, namely, in the top of the skull. All personnel with the exception of medical


officers needed in the taking of photographs and X-Rays were requested to leave the autopsy room and remain in an adjacent

On 11/22/63 of Bethesda, Maryland File # 89- 3

by SAS FRANCIS X. G'NEILL, JR.;
JAMES W. SIBERT : GIL 281

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Fig. 6-1
FBI report, by two agents who were assigned to attend the autopsy, notes that surgery was performed on the President's head prior to the beginning of the autopsy.



Parkland

. Bethesda

Fig. 6-2. Drawings of the throat as it appeared at Parkland and as it appeared at Bethesda.

At Parkland, after the tracheotomy, the gunshot wound was still recognizable in the neck. 35 At Bethesda, all that was apparent was that a tracheotomy had been made. 46 Humes said that what he saw was "...no longer at all obvious as a missile wound." 37 Burkley, who was present at the Bethesda autopsy and knew better, said nothing to assist Humes. 48 Apparently because he considered the Parkland doctors "...incompetent to discuss the wounds...Burkley could not discuss the President's wounds with competence at the Bethesda autopsy." 39

Humes phoned Dr. Perry at Parkland the next day and learned at that time that a bullet wound did exist in the 40 neck. Alteration had rendered the wound ambiguous. As seen in 1968, its description from autopsy photographs failed to describe it directly as a bullet wound. It was referred to as "...the upper half of the circumference of a circular cutaneous wound...;" the incision obscured the 41 lower half.

while Lt. Col. Pierre A. Finck, one of the autopsy
physicians, was told not to dissect the throat. a microscopic examination was made of tissue taken from the neck
wound. According to Cmdr. J. Thornton Boswell, the third
autopsy physician, it revealed "...foreign substances such
as fiber particles." Only a bullet that struck the President in the front of the neck would carry them into the
throat.

What of the frothing blood and the possibility of a wound in the chest? Humes found a bruise on the top of the

lining of the chest cavity, and one immediately below it in the lining at the top of the right lung. In 1968, it was found that while "...X-ray films show no bony damage in the thorax or neck," at the top of the right lung are "... several small metallic fragments..." An early newspaper report claimed, "...the first bullet lodged in Kennedy's lung." Dr. John K. Lattimer, a physician who viewed the autopsy pictures in 1972, believed that the bullet could have grazed vertebrae just below the base of the neck.

A complete dissection, which Dr. Finck was denied, would have shown "...the precise path of the bullet..."

There were efforts to keep the throat wound non-existent. On Nov. 22, 1963, some of the national press assumed that the President was shot once, in-and-out of the head.

Kellerman sought to convince the FBI agents and doctors

present at the autopsy that the President was not struck by

a bullet in the throat because he could speak. He told the

FBI that after the first shot, the President exclaimed, "Get

bit

me to a hospital."

The bullet that his throat and

punctured his windpipe would have rendered the President

52

speechless.

To support his point, Kellerman told the

FBI that after the first shot, he looked back and "...ob
served President Kennedy with his left hand in back of him

appearing to be reaching to a point on his right shoulder."

reacting to a shot in the back. No witness or film indicates such
a reaction.

The day after the assassination, Burkley, on the back

of a "Certificate of Death," did not mention the throat wound under section 20, "Summary of Facts Relating to Death" (Fig.6-3).

But, because Humes had contacted Perry, the throat wound could not be suppressed. On November 23rd, ABC reported that the wound was being officially admitted:

It has been announced officially in Washington that President Kennedy was actually shot twice yesterday by the assassin. One of the bullets entered Mr. Kennedy's head, another penetrated through the neck and chest. It was said officially in Washington that they did not know definitely about the second wound until this morning.

The Altered Head Wound.

At Parkland, between 4-7 cm (1.5-2.7 inches) of skull found and scalp were torn away by the shooting, in circular shape, mainly in the right rearward side. At Bethesda, Humes stated, "This wound measured approximately 13 centimeters \(\subseteq 5 \) inches \(\subseteq 1 \) in greatest diameter \(\subseteq 5 \) (Fig. 6-5).

When Humes first saw the wound, it "...was devoid of any scalp or skull..."

The two FBI agents present at the autopsy reported that there had been "...surgery...in the top of the skull."

As Kellerman phrased it. "The skull part was removed."

Boswell's chart (Fig. 6-4:) seems to indicate a large area of the skull as "missing."


The skull was also considerably fractured.

John Fitzgerald Kennedy

Sector of Performance for the Science President John Fitzgerald Kennedy, while riding in the motorcade in Dallas, Texas, on November 22, 1963, and at approximately 12:30 p.m., was struck in the head by an assassin's bullet and a second wound occurred in the posterior back at about the level of the third thoracic vertebra. The wound was shattering in type causing a fragmentation of the skull and evulsion of three particles of the skull at time of the impact, with resulting maceration of the right hemisphere of the brain. The President was rushed to Parkland Memorial Hospital, and was immediately under the care of a team of physicians at the hospital under the direction of a neurosurgeon, Kemp Clark. I arrived at the hospital approximately five minutes after the President and immediately went to the emergency room. It was evident that the wound was of such severity that it was bound to be fatal. Breathing was noted-at the time of arrival at the hospital by several members of the Secret Service. Emergency measures were employed immediately including intravenous fluid and blood. The President was pronounced dead at 1:00 p.m. by Dr. Clark and was verified by me.

To the White House,	. Washington, D.C			4 1 1
				1
		6.	E a	63 3
MIC SIGNED November 2	3, 1963 SIGNSTUPE	George Gregory I	CALLAND SOUTH	at a DM
DATE SIGNED THE STATE OF D	STONETURE	Physician to the I	President	J (Pank)
PPRIVED COURT OF INCURRY.OR	- MITARITESTIC TO CHACE	(full or will not)	BE HELD.	
PROVED COURT OF INCURATION	SIGNATURE		BE MELD.	

Fig. 6-3 Back of "Certificate of Death." signed by Burkley, showing section 20, "Summary of Pacts Relating to Death" and no mention of throat wound.



If a harmer and chisel were used as instruments to enlarge the area and to remove pieces of skull to make the wound ambiguous, the alteration succeeded. Such tools "... may create fracture lines..." 59 to confuse the damage.

Fracture lines radiated from the top of the wound and from the rear of the skull. These lines varied in both direction and length, the longest being about 19 cm (7.4 inches).

Humes noted in 1963 that skull fragments varied "...in size from a few millimeters to 10 cm. 3.9 inches/ in greatest diameter."

Seen in 1968, fragmentation extended from the front to the rear of the skull.

Looking down on the skull, fragmentation went 25 mm (1 inch) across the mid-top of the skull to the right and left.

Consequently, portions of the skull about the wound not




Fig. 6-5 Drawing of the skull showing altered wound on the right rearward side.

At mid-section, the male brain measures from 15-17 cm

(5.8-6.6 inches) in diameter. The damage to the right cerebral
hemisphere of the President's brain "...corresponded roughly
in size with the greatest diameter of the defect in the
scalp measuring some 13 cm. 25 inches7."

front-to-back in the right hemisphere. Humes testified in 1964, "The margins of this laceration at all points were jagged and irregular, with additional lacerations extending in varying directions and for varying distances from the main laceration." A panel of doctors in 1968 observed that the roof of the tear was absent as were most of the portions of the brain that once covered it. Was matter also removed from the right cerebral hemisphere not only to make the wound ambiguous, but also to attempt to find pieces of metal? The 1968 Panel noted that there remains in the brain "...a gray brown rectangular structure..." 13 x 20 mm (0.5 x 0.8%), of unknown identity.

Remaining identifiable damage to the brain gives a picture of the bullet's probable path (Fig. 6-6). In technical terms, the falx cerebri, which separated the two cerebral hemispheres, was "...extensively lacerated with disruption of the superior saggital sinus." Dr. Boswell, one of the




Fig. 6-6 Drawing of head with parts of brain denoted illustrating probable path of the bullet.

autopsy physicians, noted that the falx cerebri was "...

loose from the saggital sinus from the coronal suture
back." From front to back, the corpus callosum was

torn. In addition, there was "...a longitudinal laceration of the mid-brain through the floor of the third ventricle just behind the optic chiasm and the mammillary bodies. The flocculus cerebri and peduncle were also
torn.

X-rays showed a line of bullet fragments extending from 76 ...just above the right eye..." to the rear of the skull.

The fragments were "dustlike," most less than 1 mm (0.04 inches). Dr. Cyril H. Wecht, a pathologist who inspected the autopsy materials in 1972, noted, "...neutron activation analysis - a test that was not performed - would enable us to match fragments of infinitesimal size with a known object.

This could be done with the bullet...and the fragments still in the Archives."

Two fragments, one 7 x 2 mm (0.08 x 0.28 inches), the other 3 x 1 mm (0.12 x 0.04 inches), were found above the right eye and somewhat behind the right frontal sinus. 79

What of the point of entry in the skull? As earlier noted, Parkland doctors saw a wound in the left temple.

At Bethesda. Boswell made a revealing chart (Fig. 6-4) of the top of the skull during the autopsy. Note the rectangular configuration on the upper left side marked by a sawtoothed line and the dimension "3 cm /I.l inches/."

This could indicate that two purposes were served. One

would have been to enlarge the entrance wound in the left temple to recover the bullet. Fnlargement could have taken place in other areas of the skull for the same reason. Second, enlargement of the entrance wound in the left temple would have accomplished the same result as did enlargement of the throat wound: made it non-existent.

The half-moon shaped figure at the lower left may have been Boswell's attempt to plot the trajectory as seen from the left side.

The head on Boswell's sketch of the body (Fig. 6-8 (a)) shows a trajectory line and arrow distinctly slanting to the left toward the left temple - pointing to the same mark he made on his chart of the skull.

The line of vision from in front of the limousine (Fig. 3-6.) shows a clear view of the President's left temple.

The combined picture of the wound pattern to the skull indicates that the bullet entered above the left forehead, and in front of the coronal suture, and exited from the right, rear side.

Pieces.

According to Humes, "...the size of the large defect in the skull was so great and the fragmentation was so complex that it was impossible to accurately pinpoint the exit of the missile in the head wound."

Around 11 p.m., Humes was presented with three

pieces of bone by the Secret Service. This was late into the autopsy because Humes noted that it ended at approximately 11 p.m. One of the three pieces, 10 x 6.5 cm (4 x 2.5 inches) in size "...had been removed from the President's 84 skull." One corner of it showed tiny metal particles and "...a chipping of the top portion..." At one place on the bone, Humes thought there existed "...a roughly circular wound of exit...the diameter...to be between 2.5 and 3 cm.

\[\lambda 0.9-1.1 inches 7." Boswell felt that because an edge fit the existing skull, it could be placed "...at the very crown of the President's head on the midline."

In short, it appears that a piece of skull was removed and then chipped to create an "exit" wound. Removing that piece occasioned further fragmentation of the skull. The source of this piece was Burkley and the Secret
Service. Agent Kinney of the Secret Service allegedly
noticed the bone in the limousine at the White House garage
late in the evening, a little after 9 p.m. Kinney told
agent Boring about the piece "...on the floor of the rear of
the car near the 'jump' seat." Paul Paterni, Deputy Chief
of the Secret Service, and Boring, went to Burkley. Then,
two members of Burkley's office accompanied them back to the
garage. Around 10 p.m., "...a three-inch triangular section
of skull..." was found. The FBI did not examine the limousine until around 2 a.m., the next day, November 23rd.

After pieces of skull were removed from the wound in a clandestine operation out of sight of the autopsy doctors, they were secured and altered. As the FBI noted at the autopsy, when the body was unwrapped, there had been surgery ...in the top of the skull.

But, even with the three fragments of bone, about one quarter of the skull wound was still missing.

Some other pieces were located.

On Nov. 23, 1963, the day after the assassination, a student found a piece of bone "...approximately 25 feet south of the site where President Kennedy was assassinated."

He took it to his uncle who gave it to the Chief Pathologist at the Methodist Hospital in Dallas. The

Pathologist told the FBI, "...the bone specimen looked like it came from the occipital region of the skull."

This piece, from the back of the head, was further evidence of a rear exit wound resulting from a shot from the front.

Although the size of that piece was not mentioned in FBI reports, the FBI laboratory examined it on November 26th. They reported it contained no bullet particles. 97

The next day, this piece was brought to Burkley. There the trail ends. It was offered neither to the autopsy physicians nor to the Commission. The FBI report is still 99 classified.

Humes' supplemental report on the autopsy, presented Dec. 6, 1963, did not mention this piece of bone. Burkley not only withheld the piece from examination by Humes, but apparently also retained it; no record of its disposal exists.

A deputy shoriff found a "firecracker" sized fragment on the pavement, 8-12 inches from the south curb of Flm 101
St. He turned it over to the Secret Service. The precise location and characteristics of the bone were never determined.

A postal inspector picked up a piece of skull from the Flm St. pavement. He said it was as "...big as the end of my finger..."

Furthermore, it was one of many: "...

there was just pieces of skull and bone and corruption all 104 105

over the place..."

He later discarded it.

Rear Head Wound.


A 15 x 6 mm (0.5 x 0.2 inches) wound existed at the 106 base of the President's head on the right. It was first located about 2.5 cm (0.9 inches) "...to the right and slightly above the external occipital protuberance (Fig. 107). Parkland doctors were questioned as to whether they had seen this small hole; none had. Parkland nurses who prepared the body had not seen it.

Then a panel of doctors in 1968 who viewed the autopsy photographs placed it 10 cm (3.9 inches) above the external 110 occipital protuberance. Furthermore, they found that this wound on the scalp corresponded with a hole in the skull where, close to the depressed lower edge, a large, round metallic fragment was conveniently embedded. the same bullet size as the scenario rifle.

Why were Humes, the 1968 Panel, and those who saw the autopsy pictures in 1972 unable to agree on a simple measurement of where the bullet hole was on the back of the skull? They disagree by four inches. Humes claimed that the high measurement was due to lifting the scalp to photograph the wound.

Dr. Cyril Wecht, a pathologist who saw the pictures in 1972, observed, "...the scalp is rather tight to the underlying bone in that area..."

Furthermore, he stated, "...there just isn't that kind of open space [four inches] between the scalp and the base..."



Back of Skull

Pig. 6-7. Drawing showing back of skull and location of external occipital protuberance together with sites of both rear head wounds.

wound at base

of the skull tampered with and a 6.5 mm bullet fragment placed in there to conform with the scenario?

Did they all see the same body?

This wound appears to have been manufactured to provide an "entrance" wound at the back of the skull for the enlarged exit wound at the side of the skull. As made, it was inconsistent with a rifle shot, fired high above and from behind the President. It was too low, given the forward inclination of the President's head when he was fatally shot.

There is an explanation for this if we assume the following. By the time the error was discovered, the body was interred. Therefore, the photographs of the original false wound were replaced. Another body was prepared with the revised false wound and photographed. Because the photographs did not show the face or other prominent points of identification, such a substitution of both body and pictures could be made.

Such photographs could be used as persuasion to convince some of the validity of the wound. For example, according to a Commission lawyer, "I saw one picture taken at the autopsy, which was not technically authenticated."

He carefully stated, "it showed the back of a body with a bullet hole..."

Back Wound.


The throat wound was to have been non-existent because it would have indicated a shot fired from in front of the President. As noted, Burkley's "Certificate of Death" (Fig.6-3) on the President fails to mention the throat wound.

Therefore, an attempt was made to obliterate the throat wound's character as a bullet wound by enlarging and distorting the small trachectomy cut to a large "...wound with widely gaping irregular edges." Second, to make it appear that a shot had hit the President from the rear, a false contrance wound was made in his back.


But the throat wound could not be suppressed. Parkland doctors had talked about it at a press conference on the day of the assassination. The day after, Humes had phoned Perry at Parkland and learned that there was a bullet wound in the throat.

As a result, the back wound was moved up in order to make the entrance wound in the throat appear as an "exit" wound.


According to the two FBI agents present at the autopsy. Humes found "...an opening which appeared to be a bullet hole which was below the shoulders and two inches to the right of the middle line of the spinal column." The back wound, according to Burkley, was "...at about the level of the third thoracic vertebra (Fig.6-4; see also Fig.6-8)." Humes assistant, Boswell, marked the hole on a body chart



(A) Tracing of Comdr. Boswell's sketch made at autopsy showing position of hole



(B) Back hole as shown in FBI photographs of President's coat (FBI Ex. No. 59)



(C) Medical drawing based on Adm. Burkley's (D) Nov. 23rd description of location of back wound.



Commission Exhibit 386 made by Navy artist March 1964. Commission accepted this positioning of back wound.

and Burkley (Fig.6-8). It was at this position that the hole was punched in both the President's jacket and shirt (see Fig.6-11).

During the autopsy. Humes probed the wound with his

finger and found it very shallow: "...the end of the opening could be felt with the finger." Finck, who found
119
the wound, could locate no exit. Agent Kellerman testified that Finck used an instrument to probe and discovered
120
"...no lanes for an outlet of this entry..." Finck noted
121
that the "...edges were pushed inward." FBI agents present at the autopsy described the penetration as being "...
122
less than a finger length," and "...at a downward position of 45 to 60 degrees."

Finck asked that X-rays be made to see if a bullet was 124.

in the wound. X-rays showed no metallic fragments pre125
sent. Furthermore, no dissection was done of the wound.

Parkland doctors had felt no back wound. But all were closely questioned by the Secret Service to determine if any had seen the back and the lack of a wound. The doctors said the body was not even turned over. The nurses 129 who prepared the body had not seen it. One Parkland doctor did make a routine examination to determine if there was any injury to the back of the chest. He said, "Without taking the time to roll him over and look...I just placed my hands at about his beltline...and by slowly moving my hands

Newcomb/Adams 220

upward detected that there was no large violation of the pleural cavity." He noted that such an action "...certainly wouldn't detect a small bullet entrance." But this hole was too short to puncture the chest cavity.

The angle of the wound was made incorrectly. FBI agents described the back wound at the Bethesda autopsy as being "...at a downward posttion of 45 to 60 degrees." A surveyor later found the probable angle from the sixth floor window of the depository building, through a simulated President's body, at approximately 17 degrees. The decision to use a steep angle of 45-60 degrees by plotters probably came from knowledge of a comment made by Robert H. Jackson of the Dallas Times Herald. He stated, in a much-used quote, "We were just turning the corner and a gunman would have about a 45 degree angle from the buildings to the car."

During the autopsy, Kellerman tried to convince Kennedy loyalist Clinton Hill of the validity of the back wound. Kellerman testified, "...it was my decision to get Mr. Hill down and view this man /the President for all the damage that was done; so I went up to the floor where they /Hill and the Kennedys/ were at and brought him down and he inspected the incisions." When a Commission lawyer asked him his reason for taking that action, Kellerman answered, "More witnesses ... I think more to view the unfortunate happenings it would be a little better." 136




Fig. 6-9

To reinforce the notion that the President was shot in the back, as first proposed by Kellerman and Greer at the autopsy, Secret Service Chief Rowley sent a cover letter, with attached notes by agent Glen A. Bennett, over to the Warren Commission.

Rowley reminded the Commission that agent Bennett was an eye-witness to the back wound. Bennett, while seated in the right, rear seat of the Presidential follow-up car - a distance of some 30 feet away from the President - claimed to have seen the bullet hit Kennedy's coat "...about 4 inches down from the right shoulder ... "

It is absurd to suggest that anyone could see a 1/4-inch spot on the back of the President's coat from a distance of 30 feet while looking through the windshield of a car (this defect in the coat is difficult to see from 10 feet).

Another difficulty with Bennett's account is more serious. Photographs showing both Bennett and the President at this time reveal that

Bennett was not looking in the President's direction.

In the above drawing, based on a photograph by Willis, taken at the approximate time of the throat wound (at Z207), Bennett's head and body are turned to the right, away from the President. The dotted line indicates his line-of-vision if he had looked at the President. A photo made a second earlier by Betzner (at Z185) shows the same thing.

Mid-way through the assassination, Altgens' photo (taken at 2255) shows Bennett still looking to his right and away from the direction of the President (see Fig. 3-3: the back of Bennett's head appears immediately above the driver of the Presidential follow-up car). Between the period from Z185-Z255, equivalent to four seconds, Bennett is looking to the rear.

In addition, Bennett's note could not have been written aboard the flight to Washington, D.C., for, at that time, the back wound was nonexistent.

Bennett was a member of the Protective Research Section of the Secret Service which had the responsibility for identifying potential assassins. Just why he was working with the White House detail, particularly in the

Presidential follow-up car, remains a question.

Although Bennett's note was originally sent to the Commission in December 1963, Rowley's reminder was sent during the month of the FBI reconstruction. It was also during that FBI reconstruction in Dallas at the end of May that a Commission lawyer was shown an unauthenticated photo purportedly of a back wound in a body.

Bennett's position in the follow-up car varies according to reports by Secret Service agents who were with him. Unaccountably, they cannot agree where he was riding in the car. Most of them, including Bennett, say he sat on the right rear; the remainder give the left rear as his location.

The Warren Report (p. 111) agreed with Rowley and mave "Substantial weight ... " to Bennett's note.

AF & LANDED AT 11:35 Am. d core words Press Anea MATIL THE BOSS ARRIVED AT Affine in itely 11: 88 to a deliged with the dess and first hady after they deplaned. They best are first hady greated people on the appearance along the FENCE for expressionately, 5th 8-minutes. The Boss, First Lady, Governing Connelly & Mes Councily ENTERED THE PRESIDENTIAL CAR AT APPROX-Instaly N: 50. The Presidents Auto was driven by Bill GEETP AND THE CONTROL AGENT WAS LON KELLER MAN. I ASKED, while Noving To The followposition I should Take IN The follow-up care. MR Roboets SHO HE WANTED ME TO SE STATED IN THE READ SENT of The follow-up as a. I Took This position and held This pasition with The Ex Coption of Leaving The follow-up and assisting in the humoing well wishes who ken from the SCOMO AND ATTENTAND TO

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Commission Exhibit No. 2112



TREASURY DEPARTMENT
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE
WASHINGTON 35, D.C.

May 14, 1964

Mr. J. Lee Rankin General Counsel President's Commission on the Assessination of President Kennedy Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Rankin:

There is forwarded herewith a copy of the original notes made by Special Agent Bennett concerning his recollection of the incidents surrounding the assessination of President Kennedy on November 22, 1963.

A statement by SA Bennett was included in our original report to the Commission as Exhibit 18. The significance of the attached notes is that they were prepared by SA Bennett on the President's plane during its return flight to Washington on November 22, before the details of President Kennedy's wounds became general knowledge.

The notes have been marked as Secret Service Control 1996.

Very truly yours,

Fig. 6-9

Attachments

COMMISSION EXHIBIT No. 2112

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COMMISSION EXHIBIT No. 2112

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Kellerman's stated peasen makes no sense. According to the FBI report on the autopsy. 30 people were present at varying times during the autopsy, including two admirals.

137 one major general, and a brigadier general.

Kellerman may have hinted at the real nature of the 138 wounds when he referred to them as "incisions." Hill. apparently unconvinced, when asked about the wounds, referred specifically to the back wound as "...an opening 139

The Puzzled Pathologists.

The three Bethesda autopsy physicians - Humes, Boswell, and Finck - were puzzled at finding several wounds in the body but no bullets.

kellerman supplied an answer. "...our contention was, he testified later, "that while he /the President/ was on the stretcher in Dallas, and the neurosurgeon was working over him no doubt with pressure on the heart, this thing /the bullet/ worked itself out." When asked who he meant by "our contention," Kellerman spread the credit to include the FBI, by suggesting that it was one of the FBI agents 142 present at the autopsy. An undamaged 6.5 mm bullet was conveniently found on an empty stretcher at Parkland Hospital. It was likely that this was the bullet that Kellerman contended "worked itself out" of the body and could be matched to the scapegoat's 6.5 mm rifle found in the deposi-

62. Billy J. Martin. "Testimony of B.J. Martin /dated April 3. 19647." in Hearings, v. 6, p. 291. April 3, 1964/." in Hearings, v. 6, p. 291.

Marrion L. Baker, or cit., v. 3, p. 245.

Mrs. Robert A. Reid, "Testimony of Mrs. Robert A.

Reid /dated March 25, 1964/." in Hearings, v. 3, p. 273.

Arnold L. Rowland, "Testimony of Arnold Louis

Rowland /dated March 10, 1964/." in Hearings, v. 2, p. 181.

Luke Mooney, "Testimony of Luke Mooney /dated

March 25, 1964/." in Hearings, v. 3, p. 282.

James F. Romack, "Testimony of James Flbert Romack

/dated April 8, 1964/." in Hearings, v. 6, p. 280.

A frame from the Muchmore film shows the coats of A frame from the Muchmore film shows the coats of Ms. Hill and Ms. Moorman blowing in the wind (UPI, Four Days, P. 20).

- 63. Interview with Billy J. Martin.
- 64. Interview with Sen. Ralph W. Yarborough. .
- 65. Charles Roberts, The Truth About the Assassination, p. 17. The Texas Observer, Nov. 29, 1963, p. 5. Seth Kantor, "Kantor Fxhibit No. 3. 'Handwritten

notes made by Seth Kantor concerning events surrounding the assassination. " in Hearings, v. 20, p. 351. Manchester, op. cit., p. (P8)

66. Flizabeth Cabell, "Testimony of Mrs. Farle Cabell [dated July 13, 1964]." in Hearings, v. 7, pp. 486-487.

When interviewed by Lawrence Schiller and Hichard W. Lawis, Ms. Cabell stated, " ... we could smell the gunpowder." (Probe Label (Capitol Records, Inc.), The Controversy.)

.67 Ibid .. v. 7. p. 487.

68. Tom C. Dillard, op. cit., v. 6, p. 165.

69. Vergie Rackley, Commission Document No. 5. pp. 66-

70. Joe M. Smith, "Testimony of Joe Marshall Smith dated July 23, 1964/." in Hearings, v. 7. pp. 534-535.

Note: When interviewed by the FBI on Dec. 9, 1963. Smith denied this and claimed he smelled gunpowder in the parking lot by the depository (Commission Document No. 205 (SSID, JT), p. 310).

71. Farle V. Brown, "Testimony of Farle V. Brown Ldated April 7, 19647," in Hearings, v. 6, pp. 231-233. Commission Document No. 205, p. 311.

72. Luke Mooney, "Testimony of Luke Mooney [dated March 25. 19647. in Hearings. v. 3. p. 289.

- 73. Chicago Tribune, Nov. 22, 1963. p. 9.
- 74. New York Daily News. Nov. 24, 1963, p. 100.
- 7.5. Bobby W. Hargis, op. cit., v. 6, p. 294.
- 76. Billy J. Martin, op. cit., v. 6, p. 292.
- 77. Muchmore film.

Newcomb/Adams

- 78. Interview with James M. Chaney.
- 79. Interview with Stavis Ellis.
- 80. Interview with Douglas L. Jackson.
- 81. Willis photograph number five.
- 82. Seymour Weitzman, "Testimony of Seymour Weitzman /dated April 1, 1964/," in Hearings, v. 7, p. 107.
- 83. A doctor at Methodist Hospital identified it as a "...bone specimen that looked like it came from the occipital region of the skull." (Commission Document No. 1395.)

84. Most of the press seemed to believe that Mrs. Kennedy's actions were those of a brave wife going for help. U.F. Baughman, retired chief of the Secret Service. was asked about the Service's protective efforts in Dallas. In his reply, he said, "I can't understand why Mrs. Kennedy had to climb over the back of the car, as she did, to get help." He felt this question " ... should be resolved. (U.S. News and World Report, Dec. 23, 1963, p. 38.)

Mrs. Kennedy unsuccessfully tested David F. Powers on this area. Powers was in the follow-up car immediately behind the limousine. Apparently he failed to see the driver. "On the Thanksgiving weekend after the President's funeral, when Dave was visiting Jackie and her children at Hyannis Port, he showed her the color pictures of herself on the back of the car taken at the scene by Abraham Zapruder's movie camera and published in that week's Life ... 'Dave, what do you think I was trying to do?' she asked. Dave could only suggest that maybe she was searching for the President's doctor ... " (Kenneth P. O'Donnell and David F. Powers with Joe McCarthy, "Johnny, We Hardly Knew Ye," p. 29.)

In her brief testimony before the Warren Commission (about ten minutes), she said she didn't "...recall climbing out on the back of the cer." (v. 5, p. 181.) In this way, she avoided answering the obvious question of why she did climb out on the trunk.

76. Henry Trewhitt, McNamara: His Ordeal in the Pentagon, pp. 253, 254.

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House, p. 927 (PB).

In Sorenson's book on Kennedy, "there has...been excised...a private remark of Mr. Kennedy's...that the President would have begun his second term with a new Secretary of State." (Murray Kempton, "Sorenson's Kennedy," The Atlantic Monthly, October 1965, p. 72.)

According to John K. Galbraith, the "automatic anti-Communism of the old foreign policy establishment" was "the principal reason President Kennedy did not intend to continue Dean Rusk as Secretary." Galbraith observed, "The problem was not the doctrine but how to deal with it in a bureaucracy and country that had been so dangerously oversold on the simplicities of the Cold War. Lyndon Johnson bought both the advisers and the doctrine." (John K. Galbraith, "Seeing Things Through JFK," Saturday Review, Nov. 6, 1971, p. 41.)

Halberstam wrote that Kennedy "...was bothered by his /Rusk's over-dependence on the system. But he never felt at ease with Rusk, and in the last part of the Kennedy Administration both John and Robert Kennedy were talking with intimates about the possibility of a new Secretary of State." (David Halberstam, "Lyndon," Fsquire, August 1972, p. 88.)

According to Milton Viorst, "With certainty, it can be said that he /Rusk/ had lost Kennedy's confidence. There is some indication that Rusk contemplated resignation, and there is persuasive testimony that Kennedy was preparing for his graceful departure after the 1964 election." (Milton Viorst, "Incidentally, Who Is Dean Rusk?" Fequire, April 1968, p. 179.)

"...President Kennedy became so annoyed by Rusk's habit of playing his cards so close to his chest that not even the President could see them, that he planned to replace Rusk in his second term, probably with Robert McNamara." (Stewart Alsop. The Center, p. 122.)

77. Herbert Kaplow, ABC, Nov. 22, 1963.

Viorst quoted a friend of Johnson as saying. "Lyndon Johnson...showed a great deal of respect for Rusk's judgment from the very beginning...Besides, the President saw Rusk as the outcast of the Kennedy Cabinet. He knew a kindred spirit when he saw one. Both had been kicked around by the Arthur Schlesingers and the Dick Goodwins of the world. The President saw Rusk as wounded and he came to his support. Rusk never forgot that. Rusk immediately acquired a feeling of belonging he never had with Kennedy...With Rusk there is no hedging. His devotion to Johnson is total." (Viorst, 1bid., pp. 179-180.)

Chapter 2. Prelude to Murder

To ensure the success of their assassination, the Secret Service made certain preparations. These included controlling the order and position of the vehicles in the motorcade in order to restrict press observation, as well as limiting witnesses in Dealey Plaza, the final part of the parade where the murder would occur.

Motorcade Control.

Shortly before the Presidential airplane, Air Force
One, landed with the Kennedy party at Love Field in Dallas,
Tex., Secret Service agents lined-up the motorcade with a
series of rented automobiles and buses. On the windshield
of each vehicle, they taped a three-by-five inch white card
with a single black number. The vehicles were numbered from
one to 20 to indicate their positions; the Presidential
limousine was number seven (Fig2-1).

As the motorcade left Love Field, the vehicles were out of numerical order.

Because of the actual order, photographers and the press "...had a very, very poor view of the President's car

head, blown out. This seems to be the earliest date
when certain knowledge was expressed about the manufactured
head burst. This frame was not printed in <u>Life</u> until Oct.

2, 1964. CBS reporter Dan Rather, who saw the film in
Dallas two days after the assassination, did not mention
this dramatic burst. In addition, other movie films of this
same sequence failed to record it.

At what point did <u>Life</u> realize that it did not have the original film? It waited until May 1967 to copyright it. 62

Tell-Tale Sign.

At some time between Nov. 22, 1963, and Dec. 5, 1963, the Stemmons Freeway sign was re-positioned and raised, invalidating any accurate reconstruction of the crime.

On Dec. 16, 1963, member John McCloy commented on it and its significance before a Commission meeting: "You see this sign here," he said, pointing to a frame from the Zapruder film, "someone suggested that this sign has now been removed...from the sign you can get a good notion of where the first bullet hit." 63

It was on July 22, 1964, however, when the Commission interviewed the Dealey Plaza grounds keeper. He commented, "...they have moved some of those signs. They have moved that R.L. Thornton Freeway sign and put up a Stemmons sign."

A photograph taken during the Secret Service re-enact-

Fig. 4-10.

Frame 207 of the Zapruder film. Sign has probably been retouched to cover up most of the occupants in the cer.




Fig. 4-9

A still photograph taken from Zapruder's position during the Secret Service re-enactment on Dec. 5, 1963. Sign has been moved to the right and has been raised. Angle to the camera has also been changed.




Fig. 4-11.

Still photograph from the FBI/Warren Commission re-enactment of May 24, 1964. Sign has been moved back to approximately where it was on November 22, 1965. Notice how much of JFK stand-in is viscole over sign as compared to top photo.




Fig. 3-8 shows the positions of the four officers and the limcusine at the time of the fatal shot. The shaded area represents the zone where debris was forced out by an exiting bullet from the back of the President's head. The cone-shaped pattern indicates a shot was fired from directly in front of the President.

In terms of specific debris, (a) approximates the spot where a piece of bone from the President's skull was found, some eight-to-12 inches from the south curb of Elm St. 82 Area (B) indicates the point where another piece of bone was found the next day. 83

Mrs. Kennedy's Reaction.

The actions of Mrs. Kennedy after the fatal shot seemed to have been instinctive. That is, she simply tried to get away from the source of danger by climbing out on the trunk of the limousine. Her guard, Clinton Hill, jumped from his position on the right front running board of the Presidential follow-up car onto the back of the limousine and tried to assist her. As he reached the limousine, "Mrs. Kennedy shouted, 'They've shot his head off;' then turned and raised out of her seat..."

The Fifth Shot.

When Mrs. Kennedy was about to climb out of the Presidential limousine and Governor Connally pulled himself up and looked over into the front seat, another shot was fired. That bullet hit the windshield of the limousine. 86 The damage can be clearly seen in one of Altgens' photographs (Fig. 3-9).

The bullet hole was noted by reporter Richard Dudman. 87 Sgt. Stavis Ellis described it:

Well, it was a hole. You could put a pencil through it. I showed it to Officer Chaney out there at the hospital /Parkland/...you could take a regular standard writing pencil - wood pencil - and stick through there...and some Secret Service agent run up there and said, 'That's no bullet hole, that's a fragment.' It wasn't a damn fragment; it was a hole.

Newcomb/Adams

There was a bullet scar on the curb near the triple
89
underpass. By projecting a line, from the curb,
through the windshield of the limousine at that point in
time, it aligns near the center of the road.

The line of trajectory points to a source within the motorcade.

The Car Stop.

After the fatal shot, the Presidential limousine, which had been slowing down, came to a momentary stop. It did not accelerate as was claimed by the driver. Greer, and his front seat passenger, Kellerman. Greer testified. "...right away after the second one \(\sigma \) hot \(\sigma \) I accelerated as fast as I go could."

Kellerman stated, "...we just literally jumped out of the God-damn road."

front of the President, was looking to his right when the revolver fired ahead of him. Startled, he looked to the front and raised his hands, then turned away from the muzzle, raising his left shoulder up to his ear. He continued to turn to his right until he faced the slumping President.

The Governor paniced, possibly fearing a double-cross, and began screaming: "No, no, no, no, no. They're going to kill us both!" With the Governor's back exposed, the Secret Service agent fired into it. The Governor recoiled to the right side of the limousine, away from his wife. Blood stained the front of his shirt; he was seriously wounded.

The Presidential limousine continued slowly down Flm
St. toward a grassy slope where three men stood. One of
them yelled to the others, "Lay down, Mister, somebody is
shooting at the President."

A man filming the assassination felt that somebody had ganged-up on the President.

The Secret Service agent again aimed at the President.

He was still alive; the first shot had not been fatal.

A woman in the plaza close to the limousine yelled to her friend next to her, "Get down, they're shooting."

The agent fired. A bullet pierced the President above the forehead and exited from the right rear portion of his head. The President was then slammed back against the rear cushion and rebounded forward to the seat.

A bystander, on the grass by the limousine, thought
"...it was Secret Service agents shooting back. To me, if
somebody shoots at somebody they always shoot back..."


Mrs. Kennedy rose as the President's blood spilled on her skirt and stockings. "Oh, my God, they've killed my husband." From the back seat, she crawled onto the trunk on her hands and knees in an attempt to escape.

Though severely wounded, the Governor managed to pull himself up behind the front seat.

Moments before, seeing the danger, Mrs. Kennedy's personal guard had jumped from the running board of the President's follow-up car and was running toward the slow-moving limousine. The limousine came to a halt. Secret Service agents rushed toward it, surrounding it momentarily. The limousine started again, and Mrs. Kennedy's guard boarded its rear platform and helped her back into her seat. The limousine sped off for the hospital.

During the shooting, people near the limousine recoiled from it, fell down and tried to take cover; none did so by the depository building. After the shooting, the crowd ran down toward the limousine; none congregated around the depository and looked up.

The above was a summary of the events. What follows is a detailed examination of that summary.



President's seat was elevated almost a foot.

Just before a freeway sign, the driver began to slow down the Presidential limousine.

Suddenly, a shot came from the top of Flm St., now a half-block in back of the President. A Secret Service agent in the Vice-President's follow-up car had raised his left hand out of the partly-open left, rear door window. A revolver was fired skyward.

The crowd's attention was distracted from the Presidential limousine by the sudden explosion.

As if in response to this shot in front of the depository, a Secret Service agent in the front of the Presidential limousine fired his revolver directly at the President, striking him in the throat. A wind swept the gunsmoke and its distinctive odor back up the street.

The President raised his arms and hands to his chin, elbows out defensively, his mouth opened soundlessly. The driver, one hand on the wheel, his attention to the rear, let the Presidential limousine wander in the road.

The President, his throat torn, began to slump forward and to his left, toward his wife. He had seen the gun a split-second after he had been hit. Now he was trying to evade further injury by ducking down behind the jump seat in front of him. His back brace prevented him from moving quickly.

The Texas Governor, in the jump seat immediately in

- 7. David F. Powers in "JFK A Time to Remember," ABC-TV. Nov. 21, 1973.
 - 8. 0'Donnell, op. cit., v. 7. p. 446.

David F. Powers, "Affidavit of David F. Powers /dated May 18, 1964/," in Hearings, v. 7, p. 473.

Manchester, op. cit., p. 152 (PB).

9. Jacqueline Kennedy, "Testimony of Mrs. John F. Kennedy Zdated June 5, 19647," in Hearings, v. 5, p. 179.

Youngblood noted two unscheduled, brief stops made by the President during the motorcade. However, "...even with these two stops we were now only five minutes behind schedule. I passed the information back to LBJ, who was always interested in such matters." (Youngblood, 20 Years in the Secret Service, p. 110.)

- 10. Manchester, op. cit., p. 138 (PB).
- 11. Ralph_W. Yarborough, "Affidavit of Halph W. Yarborough /dated July 10, 1964/." in Hearings, v. 7. p. 439.

Lawrence F. O'Brien. "Testimony of Lawrence F. O'Brien /dated May 26, 19647." in Hearings, v. 7. pp. 461.

Manchester, op. cit., p. 150 (PB).

12. On Aug. 7, 1963. Jacqueline Kennedy gave birth prematurely to Patrick B. Kennedy. The baby was due later in August as was the first Texas trip.

The first tentative date for the trip to Dallas was Aug. 27. Lyndon B. Johnson's birthday (Clifton C. Carter, loc. cit.). At that time, she would have been occupied with a new child; this would also have been true for November.

Patrick Kennedy died two days after his birth.

Although she was to rest until Jan. 1, 1964, Mrs.

Kennedy's obstetrician felt she had recovered by mid-October (Manchester, op. cit., p. 9). She told the President that she would go with him to Texas. Because of this, the other wives had to be included in the motorcade. Once a complicated plot is set in motion, communication problems make it too hazardous to stop.

13. Clinton J. Hill, "Testimony of Clinton J. Hill datted March 9, 19647." in Hearings, v. 2, p. 133.

- 13 (continued). Winston G. Lawson, "Commission Exhibit No. 767. 'Attachment 4. Instructions to agents' within Preliminary Survey Report prepared by Special Agent Lawson of the Secret Service concerning President Kennedy's trip to Dallas dated November 19, 1963," in Hearings, v. 17, p. 597.
- 14. Winston G. Lawson, "Commission Exhibit No. 768. 'Attachment no. 3, scheduled motorcade list' within Final Survey..." in Hearings, v. 17, p. 615.
- 15. Manchester, op. cit., p. 152 (PB)

Newcomb/Adams

Note: Assistant Presidential Press Secretary Malcolm Kilduff; ABC reporter Robert Clark; AP White House reporter Jack Bell; Robert Baskin, <u>Dallas Morning News</u> White House reporter.

16. Jesse F. Curry, "Testimony of Jesse Edward Curry /dated April 22, 1964/7, "in Hearings, v. 4, p. 171.

Perdue W. Lawrence, "Lawrence Exhibit No. 2. 'Copy of personnel assignments for the Presidential motorcade made by Perdue W. Lawrence, dated November 21, 1963,'" in Hearings, v. 20, p. 489.

- 17. Perdue W. Lawrence, "Testimony of Perdue William Lawrence /dated July 24, 19647," in Hearings, v. 7, p. 579.
- 18. Ibid., v. 7, pp 580, 581.

M.W. Stevenson, op. cit., v. 21, p. 571

19. Curry, in an interview with the authors, noted that the Secret Service changed orders.

Marrion L. Baker, "Testimony of Marrion L. Baker /dated March 25, 19647, "in Hearings, v. 3, p. 244.

Curry learned of the motorcade route from Secret Service agents Lawson and Sorrels on Nov. 21, 1963, the day before the President arrived in Dallas (Commission Document No. 5, p. 4.)

- 20. Baker, op. cit., v. 3, p. 245.
- 21. Curry, op. cit., v. 4, p. 171.

Note: In past parades, police had their own followup car behind the Presidential limousine. The Secret Service prohibited this (Ibid.).

22. Interview with Billy J. Martin.

further back in the motorcade and, at the time of the shooting, were a block away from the limousine.

The Secret Service ordered the four motorcycle officers who did escort the limousine not to ride next to it, but to 21 drop back slightly to the rear. One of the four officers said that at morning muster the four were ordered that under no circumstances were they to leave their positions, "regardless of what happened."


Crowd Control.

The plot required the restriction of witnesses.

Police department officials had patrolmen keep people from both sides of Elm Street in the center of Dealey Plaza, the zone where the shooting would take place (Fig.2-2). The configuration of witnesses in Fig. 2-2 shows the effect of crowd control: people were bunched toward the intersection of Elm and 23 Houston Streets and away from the firing zone. Only a few witnesses were near that zone before the motorcade arrived; their presence was accidental. They were either friends of 24 policemen, or happened to wander over there at the last moment. Many had parked their cars to the west of the underpass and had walked beneath it and into the plaza.

By accident, a press photographer got into the shooting zone. Some of his pictures later on proved damaging to the plot.

James W. Altgens, with AP's Dallas Bureau, was assigned



make sure that Sen. Ralph W. Yarborough rode next to his

10

political foe, Lyndon B. Johnson. As a result, Yarborough
sat in the Vice-President's car, two cars behind the Presi
11

dential limousine. His description of the assassination
to newsmen later was very damaging to the plot.

The wives presented another problem for the Secret Service.

Mrs. Kennedy's presence in the motorcade was unplan12
ned. Because she came to Dallas, so did her loyal bodyguards,
13
Clinton J. Hill and Paul F. Landis, Jr. In addition, the
others in the motorcade brought their wives.

Without Mrs. Kennedy and the Governor's wife, Nellie Connally, the murder could have been simpler. The target would have been easier and fewer witnesses would have been available.

Communications Control.

The press pool car was the fifth automobile behind the 14

Presidential limousine. The car was owned by the telephone company and driven by an employee. Its media passengers were: Merriman Smith, a UPI White House reporter, and an Assistant Presidential press secretary in the front seat; in the back seat were an ABC reporter, an AP White House reporter, and a Dallas Morning News White House reporter.

The information from this car contributed to the success of the assassination. The car had a radiophone linked to the wire service desks in downtown Dallas, where teletype

Operators would flash reports to the world-wide networks of UPI and AP, which included all major newspapers, television, and radio stations.

The man in the center of the front seat, Smith, was directly opposite the radiophone. He grabbed the phone at the first explosion and controlled the information from the car. His report dominated the wire services in the first ten minutes after the assassination because he refused to surrender the phone to any of the other reporters in the car.

Motorcycle Escorts.

The original plan by the Dallas Police Dept. - overruled by the Secret Service - required eight motorcycle officers to ride with the Presidential limousine, four on each
16
side.

About two days before the President arrived in Dallas, an officer of the Dallas Police Dept., specially assigned to traffic control, was told by his superiors that officers 17 would ride beside the Presidential limousine. Yet, in the early evening of November 21, 1963, a Secret Service agent 18 changed this during a meeting with police officials.

Two officers originally assigned to ride beside the Presidential limousine received orders at Love Field, just after the President arrived, that "... there wouldn't be anvbody riding beside the President's car." They were placed

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57. Bruno and Greenfield, op. cit., p. 91 (PB).

According to Youngblood, three sites were considered:
"...the Trade Mart, Market Hall, and the Women's Building...
Market Hall, directly across...from the Trade Mart, was not
available, thus narrowing the choice to two." He characterized the Trade Mart as posing "...considerable security
problems..." while the Women's Building "...was ideal from a
security point of view..." But the latter "...was an unattractive place..." Without further explanation, Youngblood
stated "...although the easy security of the Fair Gounds
[Women's] Building would have simplified Secret Service
problems during the luncheon, it was agreed that the Trade
Mart would be recommended." (Rufus W. Youngblood, 20 Years
in the Secret Service, pp. 98-99.)

- 58. Ibid., p. 90 (PB).
- 59. Ibid., pp. 88-89 (PB).
- . 60. Ibid., p. 92 (PB).

61. Kenneth P. O'Donnell, "Testimony of Kenneth P. O'Donnell /dated May 18. 19647." in Hearings, v. 7. p. 443.

Secret Service agent Winston G. Lawson claimed it was Jerry Bruno's decision to hold the luncheon in the Trade Mart (Samuel A. Stern and John H. Fly. Memorandum of interview with Lawson, dated March 31, 1964, p. 2). This is contradicted by Bruno's account (The Advance Man. pp. 89-92.). It is also inconsistent with White House advanceman Jack Puterbaugh's recollection. Puterbaugh recalled he had no part in the selection of the site for the luncheon (Larry Haapanen, Interview with Jack L. Puterbaugh, dated Sept. 5, 1970.). Chief James J. Rowley, however, asserted that Puterbaugh told Lawson on Nov. 14, 1963, ... that the luncheon would be held at the Trade Mart. (James J. Rowley, "Commission Fxhibit No. 1022, Letter from the Secret Service to the Commission, dated March 26, 1964." in Hearings, v. 18, p. 715.)

- 62. Ibid. p. 442.
- 63. Ibid.
- 64. Ronnie Dugger, "John Connally: Nixon's New Quarter-back." The Atlantic Monthly, July 1971, p. 90.
- 65. Fmbassy of Japan (U.S.), <u>Japan Report</u>, v. 9, no. 21. Nov. 20, 1963, p. 2.

- 66. New York Times, Aug. 27, 1963, p. 3.
- 67. Japan Report, loc. cit.
- 68. Theodore H. White, The Making of the President 1964. p. 19 (PB).

During a press interview on March 15, 1964, Lyndon Johnson said that he did not want this happening again:
"But immediately upon returning to Washington, I made it clear to the Cabinet that we didn't want any goodly number like that leaving town at the same time, and that when the President and the next in line of succession were out of town, that we wanted most of the Cabinet here. And the President since that time has not been out of town with any appreciable number of Cabinet officers absent." (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64, v. I. p. 362.)

- 69. The line "but as fate would have it" was deleted from Salinger's book.
- 70. Pierre Salinger, "With Kennedy," Good Housekeeping, August 1966, p. 61.
 - 71. Time, Dec. 6, 1963, p. 26.
 - 72. Salinger, op. cit., p. 62.
- 73. William Manchester, The Death of a President, p. 407 (PB).
 - 74. Jim Bishop, The Day Kennedy Was Shot. p. 264.
 - 75. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 474.

tory, not to a Service Service agent's revolver.

As the altered body appeared, there was an "entrance" wound on the back, and another at the rear of the head.

The back wound lacked a point of exit.

In trying to find some answers, Humes phoned Perry at 143

Parkland on Nov. 23, 1963. At that time, Humes learned of the small bullet wound in the neck, which contrasted sharply with the grotesque distortion of Perry's tracheotomy that Humes found. Humes' notes reflect Perry's negative 144

response: "no missile in the wound."

Humes was not convinced of the authenticity of the back wound for he also asked Perry about it. Perry noted.

*...he asked me at that time if we had made any wounds in the back.**

Humes then had four wounds to explain: one at the throat, one at the back, and two in the skull. And an acceptable autopsy report had to be written. How many rewritings is unknown, however, Burkley "accepted and approved" Humes destruction of "...certain preliminary draft notes ..." (Fig.6-14. When Humes finished his final version is also unknown because that version is undated.

The autopsy had to be rethought and one point in that process occurred on the afternoon of March 11, 1964, when two Commission lawyers met with two of the three autopsy physicians in the office of Bethesda's commanding officer.

The commanding officer of Humes and Boswell, Rear Adm.

Calvin B. Galloway, used one of the commission lawyers to illustrate a version of the shooting. According to the lawyer, "...by placing one finger on my back and the second finger on the front part of my chest which indicated that the bullet traveled in a consistent downward path, to the assumption that it emerged in the opening on the President's throat which had been enlarged by the performance of the tracheotomy in Dallas." This version, which provided a previously non-existent path for the back wound, reflected 147 the "...current opinion..." of both Humes and Boswell.

Four days later, when Humes testified before the Commission, he presented his final version of the autopsy report.

148

port. which supported Galloway's illustration.


The theory of a bullet entering from the back of the neck and exiting from the front of the neck not only required a path, but also required that the back wound be moved up some four inches from its previous position.

Originally, it was too low and at too steep an angle to allow a connection with the front of the throat.

Burkley supported the new version. Humes described the new location as 14 cm (5½ inches) from the tip of the right shoulder joint and 14 cm (5½ inches) below the tip of the nipple of the bone behind the right ear. The autopsy pictures viewed in 1968 also reflect those dimensions.



Fig. 6-10 Commission Exhibit 385



Path of bullet that entered throat and remained in body.

As in the case of the rear skull wound, the possibility exists that another body was prepared with the revised back wound and photographed in such a way as not to show the face or any identifying marks. As earlier noted, this could have been the "...back of a body with a bullet hole..." shown to a Commission lawyer.

Clothing.

According to a military autopsy manual. "It should be a standing rule that...the clothing.../not7 be disturbed until examined by the pathologist." Humes saw the President's clothing for the first time on March 16, 1964, several months after the autopsy.

The limousine driver, Greer, claimed that he "...took custody of them /the clothing/ at Parkland Hospital." 155 He said. "The nurse put all his belongings into a shopping bag and...I carried them all back to Washington with me." 156 He stated that the clothing remained in his custody from Dallas to Washington, D.C. until he "...turned them over to the Secret Service Security Office, I mean Protective Research...
Mr. Bouck." 157

Greer remained with the body from Dealey Plaza until it was placed in the Fast Wing of the White House early Saturday morning. He was in the autopsy room all the time Bethesda doctors examined the body. Throughout this period, he withheld the clothing. In addition, Burkley, who

was with Greer at Parkland, also failed to tell Humes about the clothing. Burkley was Humes' superior officer at the military autopsy.

An FBI agent, after obtaining the clothing from either Greer or Burkley, delivered it to the FBI lab on Nov. 23, 160 1963.

According to an interview with Dr. Perry of Parkland

Hospital, the President's clothing included a "...T-shirt

161

A New York Times report mentioned an "...undershirt

162

Greer claimed, "...there was no undershirt."

Before the FBI received the clothing, a hole was created in both the President's shirt and jacket. The holes, however, were punched incorrectly for the final location of the back wound. They were 22-3 inches below the wound. In Fig.6-8, note the position of the wound in the back (D) and compare it with that of the holes in the clothing (D). Photographs made at the time of the shots do not show the clothing bunched-up.

An agent with the FBI laboratory described the holes on the back of the President's jacket and shirt. The jacket hole was 5 3/8 inches, and the shirt hole 5 3/4 inches, let below the top of the collar. Panel doctors who examined the clothing in 1968 placed the hole "about 12 cm 4.6 inches/below the upper edge of the coat collar." They said the hole in the shirt was "...14 cm 5.4 inches/below the upper edge of the collar."

Given the location of the wound in the back - 5% inches below the tip of the nipple of the bone behind the right ear - the holes in the clothing are 2%-3 inches below the 166-a revised wound.

The FBI described the hole at the front of the shirt as

167
"...a ragged slit approximately one-half inch in height."

168
The President's tie had a "...nick in the left side..."

The FBI lab found "traces of copper...around the margins of
169
the hole in the back of the coat...;" the rear shirt hole
170
also hed metallic residue. This implies that a metal instrument was used to punch the hole. But the FBI found
"...no metallic residue...on the tie, and...on the shirt at
171
the holes in front." The implication is that those areas
were cleaned and then distorted by tearing. The FBI "...
could not actually determine from the characteristics of the
hole \(\sqrt{in} \) the front of the shirt \(\sqrt{v} \) whether or not it was caused
172
by a bullet."

The cleaning was crucial to cover-up evidence of the frontal wound. A bullet that penetrates the clothing before it enters the body will leave a metallic residue and lubricating grease in the clothing.

Autopsy Films.

A large question exists regarding both the completeness and the authenticity of the autopsy pictures presently in the National Archives.

There were at least two x-ray sessions: one before and one during the autopsy.

The body arrived at Bethesda at 6:55 p.m. 175
minutes, it reached the autopsy room, at 7:35.

Before the autopsy began, the room was cleared except for "...medical officers needed in the taking of photographs 176 and x-rays, in which Humes participated. According to Humes, before the examination began, x-rays of the head and body were taken along with "...identification type photographs...of the full face of the late President."

FBI agents were requested to wait in an adjoining room during the first x-ray/photo session. They had to rely upon others for the count of the number of pictures taken. At 8:15 p.m., the official autopsy began: the body had been out of the FBI's view for at least 40 minutes.

During the first 40 minutes the body was at Bethesda, x-rays were made to locate the Secret Service bullets and necessary surgery done to remove them and alter wounds.

How much film was exposed on the same body? Humes failed to see an object in the brain that the 1968 Panel viewed. Further, Humes' original location of the wound at the base of the skull differed from that shown later in films seen by him, the 1968 Panel, and the two other doctors in 1972.

At least five inventories of the autopsy pictures have been made: by the FBI in 1963; by Burkley in 1965 - which remains classified; the Kennedys, and then the Naval Medical Staff, in 1966; and the 1968 Panel. No Parkland doctors have seen the pictures.

Newcomb/Adams

The amount of film varies. According to the FBI agents at the autopsy. "...a complete listing..." amounted to 56 negatives. Including 13 made of the brain in December 182 the total would be 69.

The Kennedys' inventory of only "...certain x-rays and photographs connected with the autopsy..." on Oct. 29, 1966, came to 72. Of this, missing were five exposures of 120 film, and one color negative of the brain; added were three x-rays, five exposures of 4" x 5" film, and one piece and 183 one roll of color film.

Then, on Nov. 1, 1966, the Naval Medical Staff also 184 found 72 negatives and transparencies. Which included two more brain pictures than the Kennedy inventory. In addition, the Staff noted that a roll of 120 color film "...was seized by Secret Service agents from a Navy medical corpsman ...during the autopsy and immediately exposed to light."

(See Fig. 6-11) The Staff stated that the Kennedys were in error when they claimed that five 4" x 5" black-and-white 186 negatives were exposed.

The 1968 Panel's inventory of 66 negatives failed to include the five black-and-white negatives, 4" x 5" Fkta-chrome film and one transparency, and the roll of 120 color film.

(4) One roll of 120 film (processed but showing no recognizable image) which we recall was seized by Secret Service agents from a Navy medical corpsman whose name is not known to us during the autopsy and immediately exposed to the light. This item is numbered as item 4 in Appendix B to the letter dated October 29, 1966 referred to above.

Upon completion of our examination, identification, marking, arrangement and listing of all of these photographic materials as described above, we left these materials with Dr. Rhoads. The X-rays and photographs described and listed above include all the X-rays and photographs taken by us during the autopsy, and we have no reason to believe that any other photographs or X-rays were made during the autopsy.

James J., Humes
Cantain M.C. USN

Nav. 10, 196

date

J. Thornton Boswell, M. D.

Cdr. MC. USN (Ret.)

No 1 10, 1966.

John H. Ebersole

Nov. 10, 1966

Captain, M.C., USN

John T. Stringer, Photographer date

Naval Medical Center Bethesda, Maryland 16 Nov 1966

Descriptive Descrepancies.

STOREGULDY PUREE

Description of the film also varies. In 1966, the

Naval Medical Staff found no. 2, an 8 x 10-inch x-ray, to be

of the right side of the skull. When no. 2 was viewed in

1968, the Panel said it was of the left side of the

189

skull.

The quality of the film is crucial in certain areas.

Photographs 1, 2, 44, and 45 show the cranial cavity, without the brain, from the front and above. which would show bullet damage to the skull. The Panel noted the "...lack of contrast of the structures portrayed and lack of clarity of detail in these photographs..."

The Staff, the Panel, and Dr. Lattimer, one of the two doctors who saw the films in 1972, all noted heat damage or scorch marks in two areas on x-ray no. 1, a front to back 192 view of the skull. The Staff and the Panel both observed pencil lines drawn on x-ray no. 2, though one viewed the right side and the other the left.

Lattimer observed that although Humes said films were made of the bruise on the lung, no such films were available. Perhaps also missing - unless deliberately ruined - are the "...X-rays of the head...and identification type photographs...made of the full face..." before the autopsy 195 started.

Alteration and substitution of the films could have occurred during the time the Secret Service had them in their
custody, which was from the night of the autopsy until the
196
spring of 1965. The films were given to agent Kellerman
by Humes' commanding officer, Capt. Stover.

gave them to Burkley, who, three days later, turned them

over to Secret Service agent Hobert I. Bouck, of the Protective Research Section. Bouck acknowledged, on Nov.

26. 1963, "One receipt dated Nov. 22, 1963, regarding a
carton of photographic film, undeveloped except for x-rays,

delivered...for safekeeping."

In addition, when the brain was examined on Dec. 6,

201
1963, 13 photographs were taken.

These were brought, undeveloped, to Burkley.

The military autopsy manual advises "...photographs
made by the pathologist should be attached to the final au203
topsy report." They were not. The x-rays were developed
204
at Bethesda, but not the photographs.

The autopsy pictures - basic source materials for this investigation - were not seen by the Warren Commission, with one exception. Inspector Kelley of the Secret Service privately showed one of the commission's assistant counsel one autopsy photograph of the back of a body with a hole in it.

Commission lawyers told Humes and Boswell to have 206 drawings prepared to depict the wounds. A few days before they testified, the "schematic drawings" were made based solely on the Bethesda doctors' verbal descriptions.

Other Medical Documents.

On Nov. 23, and 24, 1963, the Bethesda doctors wrote 208
their autopsy report. The evening of the 24th, Humes 209
delivered it to Burkley. Burkley, according to his note and signature, "verified" Boswell's chart, "accepted and ap-

proved" Humes' burning his preliminary draft notes on Nov. 24, 1963, and initialed "GGB" on the revised, handwritten report (Figs. 6-12, 6-13, 6-14).

Capt. Stover, Humes' commanding officer, was the gobetween. Humes gave him his notes and final handwritten report at 5 p.m., on Nov. 24, 1963. This was also "accepted and approved" by Burkley (Fig.6-15). Then Humes delivered
it to Burkley at 6:30 p.m., the same day. A typed version was sent to the White House, and to Burkley, on Nov.
212
25, 1963. From the White House, it went to the Secret
Service.

Boswell's chart, Humes' certificates turning his material over to Stover and burning his notes, and Humes' final handwritten report are reproduced in the volumes of the Warren Commission without Burkley's signature, initials, and notations. With Burkley's authorization missing, Humes is made to bear the entire responsibility. It is not known who removed Burkley's authorizations from these documents.

The record shows the autopsy doctors submitted all their reports and charts to the ...hite House and Adm. Burkley, who authorized changes and approved revisions of these documents. In effect, the autopsy doctors were being overruled by an officer outside their chain-of-command.

It is not clear from the record whether Burkley's superior, Lyndon Johnson, had anything to do with these corrections.

. Cddly, Humes was not asked by the Commission why he burned his notes.

240

The Commission received the autopsy report as an enclosure from the Secret Service on December 20, 1963. The FBI first obtained a copy of the autopsy report on December 23, 1963, and then only after making a "specific request" to the Secret Service. Until that time, the FBI was compelled to work without the Bethesda findings, and had to rely entirely on the reports of their two agents who attended the autopsy.

Newcomb/Adams

When a reporter later asked Humes why he burned his notes, Humes told him: "Use your own judgment. Would I 217 have burned anything that I thought important?" Also strangely missing, both from the printed record (Commission Exhibit No. 397) and file folder 371 in the National Archives, are the working notes Humes made during the autopsy which he later used to prepare his report. These notes were not destroyed, but were sent from Bethesda, with the last copy of the autopsy report, to Burkley, three days after the assasination. The Secret Service then took custody of the 218 papers.

Autopsy Photos, Brain, and Locked Chest.

The President's brain was removed by the Bethesda doc219
tors "...for further study..." on Nov. 22, 1963. The
brain was examined and the typed report, hand-dated Dec. 6,
220
1963, was sent to Burkley.

Microscopic sections were prepared from brain and skin 221

In terms of the brain, coronal sections were omitted.

According to pathologist Cyril Wecht, "...coronal sections parallel cuts spaced every in. or closer from one side of
the brain to the other - are the proper and routinely uniform way to examine a brain...If you do not do this, you
cannot know what the full extent of the pathology is in the

223
brain."

In terms of the skin tissue, Wecht believes "the missing slides could show microscopic characteristics of the epidermis and dermis that one sees with wounds of entrance

Same Report as Published by Warren Commission

First find, " [10,17]

Stad land, " [10,17]

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Comdr. Humes' Handwritten Autopsy Report - p. l

U. S. NAVAL MEDICAL SCHOOL NATIONAL NAVAL MEDICAL CENTER BETHEBDA, MARYLAND 20014

In reply galax

24 November 1963

C-E-R-T-I-F-I-C-A-T-E

I, James J. Humes, certify that all working papers associated with Naval Medical School Autopsy Report A63-272 have remained in my personal custody at all times. Autopsy notes and the holograph draft of the final report were handed to Commanding Officer, U. S. Naval Medical School, at 1700, 24 Movember 1963. No papers relating to this case remain in my possession.

J. J. HUMES CDR, NC, USN

Received above working papers this date.

J. R. STOVER JR. CAPT, MC, USM Commanding Officer, U.S. Haval Medic

George G. Burkley
Rear lider me of 5N

Physicians to the Charles

Fig. 6-14

Original Document



U. S. NAVAL MEDICAL SCHOOL NATIONAL NAVAL MEDICAL CENTER

In made galax

24 November 1963

C-E-R-T-I-F-I-C-A-T-E

I, James J. Humes, certify that all working papers associated with Naval Medical School Autopsy Report A63-272 have remained in my personal custody at all times. Autopsy notes and the holograph draft of the final report were handed to Commanding Officer, U. S. Naval Medical School, at 1700, 24 November 1963. No papers relating to this case remain in my possession.

J. J. HUMES CDR, MC, USN

Received above working papers this date.


J. H. STOVER J.R.
CAPT, MC, USN
Commanding Officer, U.S.


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U. S. NAVAL MEDICAL SCHOOL NATIONAL NAVAL MEDICAL CENTER BETHESDA, MARYLAND 20014

24 November 1963

COR SYLPHISCORY THEORY

C-E-R-T-I-F-I-C-A-T-E

I, James J. Humes, certify that I have destroyed by burning certain preliminary draft notes relating to Naval Medical School Autopsy Report A63-272 and have officially transmitted all other papers related to this report to higher authority.

d. L. Kunse



U. S. NAVAL MEDICAL SCHOOL NATIONAL NAVAL MEDICAL CENTER BETHESDA, MARYLAND 20014

24 November 1963

C-E-R-T-I-F-I-C-A-T-E

I, James J. Humes, certify that I have destroyed by burning certain preliminary draft notes relating to Naval Medical School Autopsy Report A63-272 and have officially transmitted all other papers related to this report to higher authority.

> d. L. Kune J. J. HUMES CDR, MC, USN

Surge G. Burkley
Rear adın Me I SM
Physician to the Privident

Same document as published by Warren Commission

Original document prepared by Comdr. Humes

FIG. 6-13

Newcomb/Adams

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and that are not found in wounds of exit."

According to Humes' supplemental autopsy report,

"during the course of this examination, seven (7) black and
white and six (6) color 4x5 inch negatives are exposed but
not developed..."

These were hand-delivered to

226

Burkley.

What happened to the brain, the slides, and the photos?
According to a Treasury Dept. official, the Secret

Service turned over the autopsy material to the Kennedys on
227

April 26, 1965. On that date, Burkley delivered a locked
chest to Mrs. Fvelyn Lincoln, President Kennedy's personal
secretary, together with a two-page inventory, dated April
26, 1965. Marion Johnson of the National Archives believed
the brain was listed. A few days later, Robert Kennedy's
secretary took the chest from Mrs. Lincoln.

On March 31, 1966, Professor Jacob Cohen tried unsuccessfully to locate the autopsy x-rays and photos at the National Archives. Corespondence between the Secret Service and the Commission failed to mention them. The Archives, irritated with this, suggested Cohen contact the Secret 230 Service.

Cohen wrote Robert Wallace, assistant secretary of the Treasury, who sent the letter to David C. Acheson, also of Treasury. Without mentioning the photos, Acheson as-

serted, "...the Service had turned all of its material over to the commission or the Archives and that the x-ray films were made available to the Commission and were in fact used in briefing the Commission staff on the autopsy procedures and results."

On April 26, 1966, Cohen wrote Acheson about the location of the autopsy x-rays and photos. He received no reply. On May 5, 1966, Cohen wrote Robert Kennedy concerning their location, and asked if Kennedy withheld these from the 232 Commission. Again, he received no reply.

In August 1966, Newsweek magazine reported that its two month inquiry failed to find the location of the autopsy photos.

Then, on Oct. 29, 1966, the Kennedys and the government reached an agreement over "preservation and safeguarding" of the autopsy x-rays and photos, and limiting access to 234 them.

On Nov. 1, 1966, the Archives received the autopsy photos 235 from the Kennedy's lawyer.

Also on Nov. 1, 1966, the Dept. of Justice asked Humes and Boswell to examine, identify, and inventory these autopsy pictures at the National Archives. They did, and wrote a report.

What is the difference between Burkley's still classifield inventory of April 26, 1965, and that of Humes/Boswell on Nov. 1, 1966? What items are missing? Marion Johnson of the National Archives said that the Kennedys want Burkley's 236 inventory kept secret. The recently released Humes/Boswell inventory, which showed destruction of autopsy films by the Secret Service, was primarily withheld because it was claimed its disclosure would have invaded the privacy of the 237 Kennedys.

On Jan. 20. 1967, the Bethesda physicians - Humes, Boswell, and Finck - met at the National Archives to examine the autopsy x-rays and photos. This was the second time in three months that Humes and Boswell were at the Archives.

A few days later, on Jan. 26, 1967, Boswell wrote Attorney General Ramsey Clark and asked, because of the controversy, 239 that an expert panel examine the autopsy materials.

On Feb. 26, and 27, 1968, such a panel of doctors reviewed the materials and wrote a report, which included an inventory of items made available to them. The materials were examined four years later by two other physicians. On Jan. 7, 1972, Dr. John K. Lattimer viewed the autopsy 241 materials at the Archives. On Aug. 23, and 24, 1972, Dr. 242 Cyril H. Wecht examined them. Absent in these examinations were the brain, the microscopic slides of brain and skin tissue, and interior photos of the head and body.

To date, no Parkland Hospital doctors have been invited to view the autopsy materials.

In sum, certain photos taken at the autopsy were removed and/or destroyed before they were deposited in the National Archives. The location of the brain, which was only partially examined, is unknown. So is the locked chest.

LBJ and the Autopsy.

As late as Nov. 26, 1963. "The White House...declined to say whether an autopsy was performed on the body of John F. Kennedy."

On Nov. 4, 1966, Johnson told a press conference, "...

most of this autopsy films has been over in the Archives
2444

stored all the time. He added, "It has always been
available to the Warren Commission and the Government, the
Justice Department, the FBI." Archivists John F. Simmons
and Marion Johnson, in March 1966, denied that the Archives
246
had the films.

In early 1968, a forthcoming, sensational trial in New Orleans held the possibility that the autopsy films might be obtained and used. On Jan. 26, 1968, Boswell requested the Attorney General to have a panel of doctors review the 247 films. The Bethesda doctors might have feared that a trial could cast doubt upon their work. Perhaps Lyndon Johnson was also troubled about this. Although his resignation statement was prepared by Jan. 17, 1968, he failed to 249 give it when he made the State of the Union Address.

Chapter Six.

- Bishop, op. cit., p. 356.
 George G. Burkley, op. cit., v. 22. p. 96.
 Manchester, op. cit., pp. 397-398 (PB).
- 2. Ibid.
- 3. Manchester, op. cit., p. 454 (PB).
- 4. Ibid., p. 435 (PB).
- 5. Ibid.

Canada claimed he sent the ambulance in case Johnson had another heart attack. He said he "...learned from his office television set that it _the flight7 would carry President Kennedy." (Ibid) News broadcasts deny this. Was Canada covering for someone?

Kellerman stated, "While airborne, arrangements were made for a Naval ambulance from the New Naval Medical Center at Bethesda to be available at the airport." (Kellerman, op. cit., v. 18, p. 726.)

- 6. Robert Abernathy, NBC, Nov. 22, 1963, 3:31 p.m., CST.
- 7. Manchester, op. cit., p. 508 (PB).
- 8. <u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 496. 508-509 (PB).
- 9. Wdward Epstein, "Manchester Unexpurgated." Commentary, July 1967, p. 28.
- 10. Burkley remained Johnson's personal physician from 12:30 p.m., Nov. 22, 1963, until Johnson retired in January 1969 (New York Times, Jan. 11, 1969, p. 4). It is likely, however, that their relationship began prior to President Kennedy's assassination.

- 11. Manchester, op. cit., p. 396 (PB).
- 12. Charles Roberts, op. cit., p. 133.
- According to Manchester, "'No, she whispered fiercely. 'Let them see what they've done. (p. 396 (PB))
 - 13. Epstein, op. cit., p. 27.
 - 14. Manchester, op. cit., p. 441 (PB).

Walter Cronkite, "LBJ: Tragedy and Transition,"

CBS News, May 2, 1970.

U.S. News & World Report, Nov. 14, 1966, p. 78.

- 15. CBS. 6:12 p.m., FST.
- 16. "Commission Exhibit No. 355. Copy of daily shift report of Secret Service Vice-Presidential detail for Friday, November 22, 1963." in Hearings. v. 16. p. 951.
- 17. Commission Document No. 7. p. 281.
- 18. John J. O'Leary, "Commission Exhibit No. 2554.
 'Statement dated Nov. 30. 1963/.' within Secret Service memorandum dated November 30. 1963, regarding activities of various Secret Service agents on November 22. 1963. in Dallas, Tex. (CD 3. Exhibit 12, items 1-5)," in Hearings, v. 25, p. 788.
- 19. Commission Document No. 7, p. 281.
- 20. Ibid.
- 21. Manchester, op. cit., pp. 391, 392.
- 22. 0'Leary, loc. cit.
- 23. Ibid.
- 24. Humas, op. cit., v. 2, p. 349.
- 25. Doris M. Nelson, "Testimony of Doris Mae Nelson /dated March 20, 1964/," in Hearings, v. 6, p. 146.

- 26. Commission Document No. 7, p. 283.
- 27. Ibid.
- 28. Humes, op. cit., v. 2, p. 354.
- 29. Josiah Thompson, Six Seconds in Dallas, p. 109.

30. James J. Humes, "Commission Fxhibit No. 397. 'Comdr. James J. Humes' handwritten autopsy report on President Kennedy and certificates regarding disposition of working papers and preliminary drafts of the autopsy report, " in Hearings. v. 17. p. 33.

"Commission Fxhibit No. 387. 'Clinical record of the autopsy protocol prepared by the Naval Medical School, Bethesda, Md., on the autopsy performed on President Kennedy.'" in Hearings, v. 16, p. 979.

- 31 Kellerman, op. cit., v. 2, p. 82.
- 32. "Commission Exhibit No. 388. 'Schematic drawing made at Bethesda Naval Hospital from descriptions of what Comdr. James J. Humes observed at time of autopsy on President Kennedy, showing skull wound as viewed from above, " in Hearings, v. 16, p. 984.
 - 33. Humes, op. cit., v. 17. p. 34; v. 16. p. 980.
 - 34. Ibid., v. 2, p. 361.

Instead of a cut at the second tracheal ring, it was "...at approximately the level of the third and fourth tracheal rings..." (Humes, op. cit., v. 12, p. 34; v. 16, p. 980.) A ring is "...about 4 mm 20.16"/ in depth..." (Henry Gray, Anatomy of the Human Body, p. 1140.)

- 35. Akin, op. cit., v. 6, p. 65.
- 36. Commission Document No. 7. p. 283.
- 37. Humes, op. cit., v. 2, p. 362.
- 38. Commission Document No. 7. p. 282.
- 39. Bishop, op. cit., p. 283.
- 40. Perry, op. cit., v. 6, p. 16; v. 3, p. 380. Humes, op. cit., v. 2, p. 361; v. 17, p. 31.

40. (Continued).

At what time Humes called Perry is open to question. Perry said Humes called him twice: around 3 p.m., and then a half-hour later (Perry, op. cit., v. 6, p. 16.). Humes mentions one conversation on Saturday morning with Perry (Humes, op. cit., v. 2, p. 362). Clark said Perry told him "...that he had talked to the Bethesda Naval Hospital on two occasions that morning..." (Clark, op. cit., v. 6, p. 23.) Clark placed the time at prior to the second Parkland news conference on November 23rd (Ibid., v. 6, pp. 22,23.). That news conference was held at 2:15 p.m., (Charles J. Price, "Price Fxhibit No. 34," in Hearings, v. 21, p. 265.)

- 41. William H. Carnes, Russell S. Fisher, Russell H. Morgan, Alan R. Moritz, 1968 Panel Review of Photographs.

 X-Ray Films, Documents and Other Fvidence Pertaining to the Fatal Wounding of President John F. Kennedy on November 22.

 1963 in Dallas, Texas, p. 9.
- 42. New Orleans States-Item, Feb. 25, 1969, p. 5B.
- 43. Associated Press, "The Lingering Shadow: The Warren Report and Its Critics," Chapter III, "The RUTIDEY."
- 44. Ibid.
- 45. Humes, op. cit., v. 17. p. 34; v. 16. p. 980. v. 2. p. 363.

The bruise was "...wedge shaped with its base toward the top of the chest and its apex down towards...the lung." (Humes, op. cit., v. 2, p. 362.) It measured about "... 5 cm /1.9 inches/ in greatest diameter." (Ibid., v. 2, p. 369.) Aside from this, Humes stated, "...there was no defect in the pleural lining of the President's chest." (Ibid., v. 2, p. 363.)

- 46. 1968 Panel. p. 15.
- 47. Ibid., p. 13.
- 48 . New York Herald Tribune, Decs 19, 1963, p. 8.
- 49. John K. Lattimer, "Observations Based on a Review of the Autopsy Photographs, X-Rays, and Related Materials of the Late President John F. Kennedy," Resident and Staff Physician, May 1972, pp. 49, 52.
- 50. 1968 Panel, p. 16.

- 51. Commission Document No. 7. p. 3.
- 52. "dward J. Epstein, Inquest, p. 61.
- 53. Commission Document No. 7. p. 7.
- 54. Don Gardner, ABC, Nov. 23, 1963.

55. Humes, op. cit., v. 2, p. 351; v. 17, p. 35; v. 16, p. 980.

The damage to the skull was on its right side "... involving chiefly the parietal hone but extending somewhat into the temporal and occipital regions." (Humes, op. cit., v. 17, p. 35; v. 16, p. 980.)

- 56. Ibid., v. 2, p. 353.
- 57. Commission Document No. 7. p. 283.
- 58. Kellerman, op. cit., v. 2, p. 81.
- 59. Armed Forces, Autopsy Manual, p. 22.

- 60. Humes, op. cit., v. 17. p. 37; v. 16. p. 981.
- 61. Ibid.
- 62. 1968 Panel, p. 10.
- 63. Ibid.
- 64. Humes, op. cit., v. 2, p. 354.
- 65. Armed Forces, Autopsy Manual, p. 72.
- 66. Humes, op. cit., v. 2, p. 355.
 Note: with greatest loss in the parietal lobe.
 (Ibid.)
- 67. Ibid., v. 2, p. 356.
 "Commission Exhibit No. 391. 'Supplementary report
 of autopsy No. A63-272, on President John F. Kennedy, Naval
 Medical School, giving gross description of brain, in
 Hearings, v. 16, p. 987.

Seen from the top, the tear was 2.5 cm (0.975") to the right of the middle of the brain. From the top, it was 5 or 6 cm (1.92-2.34") down into the brain. From the top of the skull, at its middle, it was 4.5 cm (1.755") down into the brain. (Ibid.) The difference is a diameter of about 1 cm (0.39"), or slightly larger than .38 caliber. The Secret Service is known to use .38 revolvers. (Colby. op. cit., p. 20; New York Times Magazine, Oct. 21, 1962, p. 80.)

- 68. Humes, op. cit., v. 2, p. 356.
- 69. Frontal and parietal portions. 1968 Panel, p. 8.
- 70. Ibid.
- 71. Humes. op. cit., v. 17, p. 37; v. 2, p. 355; v. 16, p. 981.
- 72. Ibid., v. 17. p. 46.
- 73. <u>Ibid.</u>, v. 2, p. 356; v. 16, p. 987. <u>1968 Panel</u>, p. 8.
- 74. Humes, op. cit., v. 2, p. 356; v. 16, p. 987.
- 75. <u>Ibid</u>. v. 2. pp. 355, 356. <u>1968</u> <u>Panel</u>. p. 7.

76. Humes, op: cit., v. 2, p. 353; v. 17, p. 38; v. 16, p. 981.

As seen from the side, in the area overlying the coronal suture, the 1968 Panel saw a "...group of finely divided fragments." running from front to back, 4.5 cm (1.7 inches) long and 0.8 cm (0.3 inches) wide. (1968 Panel, p. 11.)

77. <u>Ibid</u>., v. 2, p. 353. <u>1968 Panel</u>, p. 10.

78. Cyril H. Wecht, "Pathologist's View of JFK Autopsy: An Unsolved Case," Modern Medicine, Nov. 27, 1972, p. 32.

79. Humes, op. cit., v. 2, p. 354.
Commission Document No. 7. pp. 283-284.

The military autopsy manual notes. "Fven though the bullet is not available, it may have left metallic traces in the skin or tissues by which its composition can be determined." (Armed Forces, Autopsy Manual, p. 60.)

While Humes testified he turned the fragments over to the Secret Service (Humes, op. cit., v. 2, p. 359), in his handwritten, undated autopsy report, he says he gave them to the two FBI agents present at the autopsy (Humes, op. cit., v. 17, p. 38). The FBI agents reported they signed a receipt at the autopsy for the fragments and then took them to the FBI lab (Commission Document No. 7, p. 284). Yet, the receipt the agents signed reads: "We hereby acknowledge receipt of a missile...," not a fragment. Were there two deliveries - one to the FBI and one to the Secret Service?

At 1:45 a.m., on Nov. 23, 1963. FBI agents Sibert and O'Neill brought two fragments removed from the President's head to the FBI laboratory. (Frazier, op. cit., v. 5. p. 73.) In weight, one was 1.65 grains, the other 0.15 grains. (Ibid.)

Other bullet fragments were located elsewhere. Underneath the left jump seat of the Presidential limousine were three small lead fragments, whose total weight was 2.3 grains. (Ibid., p. 66.)

A jacketed nose area of a bullet fragment of 44.6 grains was found in the front seat next to the driver.

(Ibid., p. 67.)(Robert A. Frazier, "Testimony of Robert A. Frazier / dated March 31, 1964/." in Hearings. v. 3. p. 432.)

The Secret Service supposedly found it in the limousine in Washington, D.C., after 9 p.m. (Cormission Document No. 80, p. 3). Paul Paterni and Floyd M. Boring of the Sec et Service gave it to Orrin Bartlett of the FBI who brought it to the FBI laboratory at 11:50 p.m., on Nov. 22, 1963. (Ibid., v. 5, p. 67.)

79 (Continued).

A bottom portion of a bullet jacket fragment of 21 grains was found on the floor by the right side of the front seat of the limousine. (<u>Ibid</u>.) The same chain-of-possession occurred (<u>Ibid</u>., pp. 67-68). A deposit of lead was present on the inside surface of the limousine windshield (<u>Ibid</u>., p. 68).

The FBI was unable to examine the limousine until the early morning of the next day (<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 71). Its laboratory compared all the fragments, including those taken from Governor Connally (<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 74). It could only say. "... they are of similar lead composition," (<u>Ibid.</u>) and nothing more specific.

A suit to obtain a classified spectrographic analysis of the bullet fragments was not supported by the U.S. Supreme Court on May 13. 1974 (Weisberg v. Dept. of Justice, no. 73-1138).

According to Commission general counsel J. Lee Rankin in January 1964. "...the Atomic Energy Commission...are trying to determine...whether they can relate them /the bullet fragments/ to various guns and the different parts..."

(Commission, Report of Proceedings, Jan. 27, 1964, p. 194)

The U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration advised that the FBI, which "...was in charge of the work," be contacted for the report. The FRDA noted, "Emission spectroscopic analysis and neutron activation analysis methods were used on the paraffin casts (taken from L. Oswald) and bullet fragments to try to determine, respectively, the source of primer residue as well as the correlation in identification of the bullet fragments. The neutron activation technique is one of the most sensitive modes of trace metal analysis..." (James L. Liverman, Letter to Fred T. Newcomb, dated Feb. 13, 1975)

Whether or not all or some of the fragments were planted is another question.

- 80. Humes, op. cit., v. 2, p. 371.
- 81. New Orleans States-Item, Feb. 24, 1969, p. 7B.
- 82. Humas, op. cit., v. 2, p. 354.
- 83. James J. Humes, J. Thornton Boswell, and Pierre A. Finck Finck Final Pierre A. Finck Final Pierre A. Finck 7. Thornton of Autopsy X-Rays and Photographs on Jan. 30, 1962, p. 1.

- 84. Commission Document No. 7. p. 285.
- 85. Ibid.
- 86. Humas, op. cit., v. 2. pp. 355. 357.

 Commission Document No. 7. p. 285.
- 87. Thompson, op. cit., p. 109.
- 88. Commission Document No. 80. p. 3.
- 89. Ibid.
- 90. Ibid.
- 91. Frazier, op. cit., v. 5. p. 71.
- 92. Commission Document No. 7. p. 283.

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- 93. Humes, op. cit., v. 2, p. 354.
- 94. William G. Harper.

 <u>Commission Document No. 5. pp. 150, 151.</u>

 <u>Commission Document No. 1395.</u>
- 95. Dr. Jack C. Harper. Dr. A.B. Cairns. Commission Document No. 1395.
- 96. Ibid.,
- 97. Commission Document No. 5. p. 151.
- 98. Ibid.
- 99. Commission Document No. 1269.
- 100. "Commission Exhibit No. 391," op. cit., v. 16. pp. 987-989.
- 101. Weitzman, op. cit., v. 7, p. 107.
- 102. Ibid.
- 103. Interview with Harry D. Holmes.
- 104. Ibid.
- 105. Ibid.
- 106. Humes, op. cit., v. 17. p. 36; v. 16, p. 981.
- 107. Ibid.
- 108. Carrico, op. cit., v. 3, p. 361.

 Perry, op. cit., v. 3, p. 372; v. 6, p. 16.

 Clark, op. cit., v. 6, p. 25.

 McClelland, op. cit., v. 6, p. 35.

 Peters, op. cit., v. 6, p. 71.
- 109. Diana H. Bowron, "Testimony of Diana Hamilton Bowron /dated March 24, 1964/," in Hearings. v. 6, p. 136.

 Henchliffe, op. cit., v. 6, p. 141.
- 110. <u>1968 Panel</u>, p. 11. Lattimer, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., p. 52.
- 111. 1968 Panel, p. 11.
- 112. Humes et al., Fxamination. p. 3.
- 113. United States, ex rel. State of Louisiana v. Dr. James B. Rhoads, District of Columbia Court of General Sessions, Civil Division, Misc. no. 825-69A, Feb. 14, 1969, p. 14.

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- 114. Ib1d.
- 115 . Richard J. Whalen, "Kennedy Assassination," The Saturday Fvening Post, Jan. 14, 1967, p. 69.
 - 116. Ibid.
 - 117. Commission Document No. 7. p. 284.
- 118. Commission Document No. 7. p. 284.
- 119. New Orleans States-Item. Feb. 25, 1969, p. 5A.
- 120. Kellerman, op. cit., v. 2, p. 93.
- 121. New Orleans States-Item. Feb. 24, 1969, p. 7B.
- 122. FBI Supplemental Report, Jan. 13, 1964, p. 2.
- 123. Commission Document No. 7. p. 284.
- 124. New Orleans States-Item, Feb. 25, 1969, p. 5A.
- 125. Humes, op. cit., v. 2. p. 361. Greer, op. cit., v. 2, p. 127.
- 126. New Orleans States-Item, Feb. 25, 1969, p. 5A.
- 127. Carrico, op. cit., v. 3, pp. 358, 360.
- 128. Carrico, op. cit., v. 3, p. 368; v. 6, p. 3.

 Perry, op. cit., v. 3, p. 382; v. 6, p. 17.

 Clark, op. cit., v. 6, pp. 25, 29.

 McClelland, op. cit., v. 6, pp. 34, 39.

 Jones, op. cit., v. 6, p. 56.
- 129. Bowron, op. cit., v.6, p. 136. Henchliffe, op. cit., v. 6, p. 141.
- 130. Carrico, op. cit., v. 6, p. 4.
- 131. Ibid., p. 3.
- 132. Ibid., p. 4.
- 133. Report of the President's Commission, p. 106.
- 134. CBS Log. KRLD Dallas, Reel No. 5 "B." Nov. 22, 1963, p. 12, approximately 5 p.m.

- 135. Kellerman, oo. cit., v. 2, p. 100.
 - 136. Ibid.
 - 137. Commission Document No. 7. pp. 281-283.
- 138. Kellerman, op. cit., v. 2, p. 100.
- 139. Hill, op. cit., v. 2, p. 143.
- 140. Commission Document No. 2. p. 284.
- 141. Kellerman, op. cit., v. 2, p. 93. Bishop, op. cit., pp. 498, 499.
- 142. Ibid.
- 143. Perry, op. cit., v. 6, p. 16.
- 144. Humes, op. cit., v. 17, p. 29.
- 145. Perry, op. cit., v. 6, p. 17.
- 146. Humes, op. cit., v. 17, p. 30; v. 16, p. 978.
- 147. Arlen Specter, Memorandum to J. Lee Rankin, dated March 12, ..., p. 1.
 - 148. Humas, op. cit., v. 2, p. 350.
 - 149. Ibid., v. 16, p. 981.
 - 160.Manchester, op. cit., p. 178 (PB).
- 151. Humes, op. cit., v. 17, pp. 33-34; v. 16, p. 980.
- 152. 1968 Panel, pp. 8, 9.
- 153. Armed Forces, Autopsy Manual, p. 56.
- 154. Humes, op. cit., v. 2, p. 364.

- 155. Greer, op. cit., v. 2. p. 125.
- 156. Ibid.

 Interview with William R. Greer.
- 157. Ibid.
- 158. Greer, op. cit., v. 18, p. 723.
- 159. Commission Document No. 7, p. 282.
- 160. Commission Document No. 205. p. 153.
- 161. Jimmy Breslin, "A Death in Fmergency Room No. One."
 The Saturday Evening Post, Dec. 14, 1963, p. 30.
- 162. New York Times. Nov. 30, 1963, p. 10.
- 163. Greer, op. cit. v. 2. p. 125. .
- 164. Frazier, op. cit., v. 5, pp. 59, 60.
- 165. 1968 Panel, p. 13.
- 166. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 14.

166-a. The location of the hole nearly six inches down from the coat collar also conflicted with "schematic drawings" of the back wound prepared for Humes' testimony. The drawing located the back wound at the top of the shoulder. Humes' explanation included his assertion that the President's muscular development would cause the hole in the coat to fit high on his back. (Humes, op. cit., v. 2, p. 366.) Compare "Commission Exhibit No. 393. 'Coat worn by President Kennedy at time of assassination,'" in Hearings, v. 17, p. 24, with "Commission Exhibit No. 386. 'Schematic drawing made at Bethesda Naval Hospital from description of what Comdr. James J. Humes observed at time of autopsy on President Kennedy, showing view from posterior aspect of entry wound to neck area and also the skull wound, "in Hearings, v. 16, p. 977.

- 167. Frazier, op. cit., v. 5, p. 61.
- 168. Ibid., p. 62.
- 169. Ibid., p. 59.
- 170. Ibid., p. 62.
- 171. Ibid.

- 172. Ibid., p. 61.
- 173. Paulette Cooper, "President Kennedy's Brain Is Missing," True, May 1973. p. 119.
- 174. O'Leary, op. cit., v. 25, p. 788.
- 175. Humas, op. cit., v. 2, p. 349.
- 176. Commission Document No. 7, p. 283.
- 177. Humes, loc. cit.
- 178. Ibid.
- 179. Commission Document No. 7. loc. cit.
- 180. See Chart II.

I Chart . INVENTORY OF AUTOPSY PICTURES

Nov. 26, 1963

Oct. 29, 1966

NEG.			NEC.	-	
TYPE	NO.	COMMENTS	TYPE	NO.	COMNENTS
X-Ray	1 2 3 4 5 6		X-Ray 10x12	1 2 3 4 5 6	
	7 8 9 10 11		X-Ray 14x17	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	Missing Nov. 26, 1963
B&W 4x5	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18		B&W NEGS	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	
			B&W 4x5	19 20 21 22 23 24 25	During examination of the hrain on Dec. 6, 1963, seven black and white negatives were exposed (Coumission Exhibit No. 391, v. 16, p. 988).

(Continued)

Oct. 29, 1966 (continued) Nov. 26, 1963 (cont.) NEG. TYPE NO. COMMENTS COLOR 4x5 1 COMMENTS TYPE COLOR TRANS-PARENCY 4x5 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 During examination of the brain on 24 Dec. 6, 1963, six color 4x5 negatives were exposed (Commission Exhibit No. 391, v. 16, p. 988).

Only five on this date. Exposed. No image. FILM 2 COLOR I FILM Roll Exposed. Back, with no image. COLOR 1 Note: In the explicit language of their

"a complete TOTAL 56 listing" by FBI

Exposed.

120 FILM

> TOTAL 72 Negatives & Transparencies 1 Roll of film

> (New York Times, Jan. 6, 1968, p. 15).

Source: Commission Doc. No. 7., p. 285 Source: New York Times, Jan. 6, 1968, pp.1, 15

agreement with the government, the Kennedys

turned over "...certain X-rays and photographs connected with the autopsy..," not all

INVENTORY: N	ov. 1, 19	66
--------------	-----------	----

YEG.	no.	ID NO.	DESCRIPTION	COMMENTS
(-Ray	-	ID NO.	Disorti I I On	
3x10	1 2	21296	SKULL; front-back view. " side, right.	"slight heat damaged" "two angle lines over- drawn on the film"
	3		" side view.	
	4	None.	BONE fragments, three.	Numbers 1-6: 10x12 size
	5		"	on Oct. 29, 1966.
	16	"		
K-Ray				
14x17		21296	ABDOMEN; front-back view.	
	8	"	SHOULDER, right & CHEST, right.	front-back view.
	9	"	CHEST; front-back view.	2 5 2 2 3
	10	"	SHOULDER, left & CHEST, left.	front-back view.
	11	"	CHEST, lower & ABDOMEN.	front-back view.
	12	"	THICHS, both & KNEE JOINTS, both	
	13		PELVIS; front-back view.	"a small round density of myelogram media projected over the sacral canal"
	14	"	PELVIS, lower; HIPS & THICHS, upper; front-back view.	
B&W				
NEGS	1		HEAD, left, & SHOULDERS.	
4x5	1 2		similar	
4×5 . i	1 3		"	
	1 4	1		
	5		HEAD, right & SHOULDER, right.	
			similar	
	7		HEAD, above.	
	8		similar ,	
	9			
	10		Guorgi nem	
	12		SHOULDER, wound; back view.	
	13		HEAD. front & TORSO. upper.	Shows tracheotomy wound.
	14		similar	"somewhat closer view"
	15		SKULL, wound, right, rear.	occipital area.
	16		similar	occipital area.
	17		11	shows wound "following
	-			reflection of scalp"
	18		, n - s	v
	19	JTB	BRAIN, below.	
	20	11	" above.	
1	21	"	" below.	
	22	**	H .	"direct basilar view"
	23	"	" above.	Shows "extensive damage to right cerebral hemisphere
1	24 25	* 1	similar	
-	25	**	"	

Nov. 1, 1966 (continued)

NEG. TYPE	No.	DESCRIPTION	COMMENTS	7			
COLOR	26	MEAD, right side.	1				
TRANS-	27	similar	i				
PAREN-	28		i				
CIES	29	HEAD, left side.					
4x5	30	similar	1				
	31	1					
		HEAD, above.					
		similar .					
	34	"					
	35						
	36						
	-	"					
1	37						
	38 39	SHOULDER, wound, right, upper back					
	40	HEAD & TORSO, upper front.	Shows tracheoto	my wound.			
	41	similar					
0. 3	42	HEAD, wound, right occipital area.					
	43	similar					
	44	HEAD, wound, back.	"with scalp	reflected.			
	45		******* Boarp	101100000			
	46	BRAIN, below.					
	47	similar					
	48	"					
	49	Color perstives no transperson	Made from 47	bick bee			
	47	Color negative; no transparency. Has brush hair.	hade from 41, W	nich has			
	50	BRAIN, above.	better color intensity.				
		similar					
	51	similar					
B&W	52		Now seven brain				
	1	Unexposed.	Kennedys claim	exposed.			
NEGS	0		Developed.				
4x5	2						
	3		"				
	4		"				
	5_	"	n n				
EKTACH				-125 - 52 H C - 15 S			
FILM 40		Unexposed.	Undeveloped.				
		TRANSPARENCY					
		Unexposed.	Developed.	*			
120 CQI			Processed. SS	seized and			
DYTES T	2011	No recognizable image.	exposed it to 1				

TOTAL 72 Negatives & Transparencies.
2 Rolls of film

Source: James J. Humes, J. Thornton Boswell, John H. Ebersole, and John .
T. Stringer, Report of Inspection by Naval Medical Staff on
November 1, 1966 at National Archives of X-Rays and Photographs
of Autopsy of President John F. Kennedy.

INVENTORY: Feb. 26-27, 1968

YPE	no.	ID NO.	DESCRIPTION	CONKERTS					
-Ray	1	21296	SKULL; front-back view.	Possible heat damage in two small areas.					
	2	21296	SKULL; left side.	Right side in Nov. 1966. Show rear hole 4" high. Converging pencil lines drawn on film.					
	1 . 1								
	3 4		SKULL FRAGMENTS.	Slightly different projection					
			SAULD PRAGMENTS.						
	5								
	7		CHEST & STOMACH: front-back view.						
	8	*	CHEST, right & SHOULDER & ARM, upper; front-back, view.	Lower neck can be seen.					
	9		CHEST; front-back view.						
1 1 1 1 1	10	10	CHEST, left & SHOULDER & ARM,						
			upper; front-back view.						
12 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19	11	11	CHEST & STOMACH; front-back view.						
	12		THIGHS; lower & KNEES; front-back.						
	13	**	PELVIS, front-back view.	"a small, round opaque					
				structurel mm in diameter to the right of the midline the first sacral segment the spine."					
	14	**	LEGS, upper; front-back view.	the spine."					
	18	1 JB	HEAD & NECK, left side.						
		2 "	man a mook, rere side.						
	6	3 "							
	1000	4 "							
	12	5 "	HEAD, right & above + part of face, NECK. SHOULDER + CHEST, upper.						
	11	6 "	MACA, SHOULDER + CHEST, upper.						
	8	7 "	UPAN share						
		8 "	HEAD, above.						
	10000	9 "							
	16	10 "							
	9	11 "	BACK & NECK.						
	10	12 "	DACE & RECE.						
	4	13 "	HEAD, right & above + part of face, NECK, SHOULDER + CHEST, upper.	*					
	3	14 "	n n						
	14	15 "	HEAD, back.						
	7	16 "	H H						
	2	17 "	CRANIAL CAVITY, above, front - brain removed.	Lack of constrast & clarity of detail.					
	1	18 "	A CONTRACTOR OF THE CONTRACTOR	or devarr.					
3&1		19 JTB	BRAIN.	Same as 46-52.					
TEGS	1 8	20 "							
1100000	1	21 "							
		22 "	**	n					
		23 "							
	1	24 "	#						
	4	25 11							

(Continued)

Feb. 26-27, 1968 (continued)

10.	DESCRIPTION	COMMENTS
26	HEAD, right & above + part of face, NECK, SHOULDER + CHEST, upper.	
27	•	
28		1
29	HEAD & NECK, left side.	
30	•	
31		
32	HEAD, above.	
33		
34		
35		
36		
36 37		
38	BACK + NECK.	
39		
40	HEAD, right & above + part of face, NECK, SHOULDER + CHEST, upper.	3
41		
42	HEAD, back.	
43	*	
44	CRANIAL CAVITY, above, front - brain removed.	Lack of contrast & clarity of detail.
45		
46	BRAIN, below.	
47	*	
48		
49	• • •	
50	BRAIN, above.	Gray-brown rectangular
51		structure, 13 x 20 mm pre-
1		sent. Not noted in pre-
52	*	vious inventories.

TOTAL 66 Negatives.

Source: William H. Carnes, Russell S. Fisher, Russell H. Morgan, Alan R. Moritz, 1968 Panel Review of Photographs, X-Ray Films, Documents and Other Evidence Pertaining to the Fatal Hounding of President John F. Kennedy on November 22, 1963 in Dallas, Texas.

- 181. Commission Document No. 2. p. 285.
- 182. "Commission Fxhibit No. 391," op. cit., v. 16, p. 988.
- 183. New York Times, Jan. 6, 1968, p. 15.
- 184 James J. Humes, J. Thornton Boswell, John H. Fbersole, and John T. Stringer, Report of Inspection by Naval Medical Staff on November 1, 1966 at National Archives of X-Rays and Photographs of Autopsy of President John F. Kennedy.
- 185 Ibid .. p. 11.
- 186 Ibid., p. 10.
- 18% 1968 Panel.
- 188 Naval Medical Staff, Report, p. 2.
- 189 1968 Panel. p. 5.
- 190 Ibid., pp. 7, 5.
- 191 Ibid .. p. 7.
- 192 Naval Medical Staff, Report, p. 2. 1968 Panel, p. 12. Lattimer, op. cit., p. 47.
- 193 Naval Medical Staff, Report, loc. cit. 1968 Panel, loc. cit.
- 194 Lattimer, <u>loc. cit.</u> Humes, <u>op. cit.</u>, v. 2, p. 353.
- 195 Humes, op. cit., v. 2, p. 349.
- 196 Whalen, op. cit., p. 69.
- 19.7 Commission Document No. 7, p. 285.

 Kellerman gave a receipt for these films that is not in the evidence at the National Archives. On April 2, 1973.

 Jane F. Smith, director, Civil Archives Division, wrote, "We do not have the receipt signed by Special Agent Roy Kellerman for films taken at the autopsy of President Kennedy."
- 198 Humes, op. cit., v. 2, p. 351.

XXXX XXXXX

199. Commission Document No. 371. P. 1 103000 200. Thid 201. "Commission Fxhibit No. 391." op. cit., v. 16, p. 988.

- 202. Ibid.
- 203 Armed Forces, Autopsy Manual, p. 56.
- 204 Humes, op. cit., v. 2, p. 372.
- 205 Whalen, loc. cit.
- 206. Arlen Specter, "Memorandum to Mr. J. Lee Hankin; Subject: Interview of Autopsy Surgeons," dated March 12, 1964, p. 2.

 Humes, op. cit., v. 2, p. 350.
- 207. Humes, op. cit., v. 2. p. 350.
- 208 Humes et al. [Examination]. p. 1.
- 209. Ibid.
- 210 Humes, op. cit., v. 17, p. 47.
- 211. Humes et al. [Examination]. p. 1.
- 218 Commission Document No. 371, p. 99.

 Fletcher Knebel, "A New Wave of Doubt; Concerning Inquest by F.J. Epstein," Look, July 12, 1966, p. 71.
- 213 Ibid.
- 214 See "Commission Fxhibit No. 397." op. cit.. v. 17. pp. 30. 45, 47, and 48.
- 215 Knebel, op. cit., p. 71.
- 216 New York Times, Dec. 26, 1966, p. 25.
- 21% Whalen, loc. cit.
- 218 Ibid.
- 219. Humes, op. cit., v. 16, p. 981.
- 220 "Commission Fxhibit No. 391." op. cit., v. 16. pp. 987-989.
- 221 Ibid.
- 222 Ibid., p. 987.
- 223 Wecht, op. cit., p. 32.
- 224 Ibid., p. 31.

225 "Commission Exhibit No. 391." op. cit., v. 16, p. 988.

- 226. Ibid.
- 227. Whalen, cit.
- 228. New York Times. Aug. 27, 1972, p. 57.
- 229. Ibid.

The

- 236. Jacob Cohen. "What the Warren Report Omits: A Vital Documents," Nation, July 11, 1966, p. 47.
- 231. Ibid.
- 232. Ibid.
- 233. Newsweek, Aug. 15, 1966, p. 31.
- 234. New York Times, Jan. 6, 1968, p. 15.
- 235. Ibid., Aug. 27, 1972, p. 57.
- 236. New York Times, Aug. 27. 1972, p. 57.
- 237. James B. Rhoads, Letter to Fred T. Newcomb, deted June 20, 1972.
- 238. Humes et al. [Fxamination], p. 2.
- 239. J. Thornton Boswell, "Letter to the Honorable Ramsey Clark, Attorney General," dated Jan. 26, 1968.
- 240. 1968 Panel, pp. 5-6.
- 241. New York Times, Jan. 9, 1972, p. 1.
- 242. Ibid., Aug. 27, 1972. p. 1.
- 243. Washington Evening Star. Nov. 26, 1963. p. 5.
- 244. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, v. 2, p. 1322.
- 245. Ibid.
- 246. Cohen, op. cit., p. 47.
- 247. Boswell, loc. cit.

248. Their report was released a year later. Its timing was deliberate: "Release of the report was connected with the court case in which New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison is seeking release of the autopsy photographs and x-rays." (Los Angeles Times, Jan. 17, 1969, pt. 1, p. 19.)

249. Lady Bird Johnson, "A White House Diary Part II: The Last Years: Doubts and Dilemmas," McCall's. Dec. 1970. p. 104.

Walter Cronkite, CBS News, "LBJ: Why I Chose Not To Run," Dec. 27, 1969.

Johnson, The Vantage Point, op. cit., p. 429.

Part IV.

"'Greetings from the Deer Country of Texas'

"We hope your holiday season will be more delectable because of our hunting season. In Texas, from November 15 on, the hills are alive with the sound of hunters. Here is the result, killed this year by our trusty rifles, on the LBJ ranch.

/Lyndon B. Johnson's/ Christmas note to friends 1963"

(Jack Shepherd and Christopher S. Wren, Quotations from Chairman IBJ, p. 183.)

Chapter 7. Scapegoat

Consolidation of the conspirators gains falls within three areas: a scapegoat, a war, and Robert Kennedy.

To strengthen their hand, the plotters needed certain supportive elements. A scapegoat, a planted bullet, and a rebuilt limousine were subject to direct control. A commission of investigation could be influenced.

The aftermath of the assassination was a victory for in those, especially some of the military, who had long opposed forcian President Kennedy's peaceful policies. Had he lived, there escalation would have been no war, in Vietnam.

The President's brother made an attempt to move against these forces, but to no avail.

Scapegoat.

Lee H. Oswald said that he was on the first floor lunchroom of the depository building, during the shooting, and
then went to the second floor for a coca-cola. In less
than a minute and 15 seconds after the first shot, a po_
lice officer ran into the depository, thinking the shots had

come from one of the upper floors, and found Oswald in the lunchroom, "...calm and collected," "...drinking a coke." At the time, the officer held his drawn gun three feet from Oswald. 5

As the officer pointed his gun at Oswald, the manager of the depository ran up and identified Oswald as an employee.

The officer was neither asked nor did he explain why he had singled-out Oswald from among others in the building; he did not see a gunman fire from the building.

A clerical supervisor passed Oswald on the second floor more than two minutes after the last shot had been fired. She said he was "very calm." and was walking slowly.

Orders for the Dodd Committee.

Oswald answered mail-order gun ads at a time when a Senate subcommittee was investigating the gun mail-order business. Hearings ran from January to May 1963, and began again in the spring of 1964. Both firms that Oswald ordered from were being investigated.

This subcommittee, chaired by Sen. Thomas J. Dodd.
hired investigators to sample the market in mail-order guns.
The investigators would place mail orders to determine if companies followed federal and state laws.

In March 1963, Oswald, under the name A.J. Hidell.
sent for some mail-order guns. He ordered a 36-inch, 6.5 mm
Italian carbine from Klein's Sporting Goods Inc. of Chicago.

Ill. From Seaport Traders Inc., of Los Angeles, Calif., he ordered a Smith and Wesson .38, with a two-inch bar12
rel. Klein's and Seaport shipped the guns on March 20,
1963, to Post Office Box 2915, Dallas, Tex. Klein's sent the rifle via Parcel Post; Seaport shipped the revolver by
14
Railway Express.

No record exists to show that Hidell/Oswald ever took possession of these weapons. Part three of postal form no. 1039, which lists those with access to a postal box, was 15 thrown away. Postal regulations require that this be kept 16 for two years after the box is closed.

Texas law requires "purchaser of pistol must secure certificate of good character from Justice of Peace, County 17

Judge or District Judge." Railway Fxpress, by its own rules, must compare a customer's signature with his signature on a legal document, such as a driver's license. No Railway Fxpress forms are in evidence to show the revolver was actually delivered.

Both rifle and revolver were available in several Dal19
les gun shops at the time. Oswald told police and the FBI
during interrogation that he bought the revolver in Fort
19-a
Worth.

But Oswald's role went further than merely placing orders. If he could engage in visible and provocative activities and still buy mail-order guns, then the Dodd Committee could use this record at hearings with mail-order dealers. There were several examples.

On Aug. 9. 1963, while Oswald distributed "Fair Play

for Cuba" literature in New Orleans, he got into a fight and was arrested. As the Warren Report noted, "...he asked the New Orleans police to arrange for him to be intervied by the FBI." During that interview in jail, he claimed 22 that a man named Hidell asked him to pass out literature. He also told a local attorney that someone paid him \$25 a day to do this.

Newcomb/Adams

On Aug. 17, 1963. Oswald was interviewed on a New 24 Orleans radio station about his pro-Castro activities.

Four days later, on the same station, he was part of a panel discussion with an anti-Castro Cuban who, at a press conference afterwards, called for a congressional investigation 25 of Oswald.

In September 1963, Oswald went to Mexico City where he applied for a visa at both the Soviet Embassy and the Cuban Consulate.

Such activities, plus his background of ostensible defection to Russia, came to the attention of several federal agencies, including the Secret Service.

After the assassination, police found blank mail order coupons and complete ads among Oswald's belongings in Dallas.

One of the coupons found matched a June 1963 issue of the American Rifleman magazine, which was located in the Crescent City garage in New Orleans, La.

The Crescent City garage, as well as its part-owner,
Adrian T. Alba, and Oswald, were well-known to the Secret
Service. Their official cars were stored there.

Oswald would brouse through a collection of gun maga-

Newcomb/Adams

Newcomb/Adams

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zines at the Crescent City garage and discuss them with Alba. According to Alba, Oswald "...pursued the issued of ordering guns and how many guns had I ordered, and how long did it take to get them, and where had I ordered from." 31

The day after the assassination, the Secret Service examined these magazines, and took "...two of the guns magazines..." from the garage. 32 By the time the FBI arrived, these magazines had been removed. 33

When the Dallas police arrested Oswald, they found he had a revolver, serial number V510210, in his possession. 34

In the spring of 1964, the Dodd Committee again held hearings. The committee asked that Seaport Fraders, where Oswald had ordered his revolver, furnish it with originals, or copies, of their invoices for the years 1961-1963. Seaport was required to keep these records under Federal Law, enforced by the Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Division (ATF) of the Internal Revenue Service - like the Secret Service - a part of the Freasury Department. 35

The owner of Seaport Traders was tardy in supplying Dodd with the requested records. On April 25, 1964, Dodd charged the owner with stalling. The Seaport had supplied a list of gun shipments, with dates, addresses, and serial numbers, instead of copies of the actual invoices. The Committee found that the list was incomplete. The ATF, which licenses gun dealers, made up the incomplete list for Seaport. The ATF or Seaport.

The Dodd Committee published charts, based on the ATF-prepared Seaport records, to show a breakdown of shipments by geographical locations, from 1961-1963. The chart shows Seaport did not ship a .38 Smith and Wesson revolver to Dallas in 1963 (Fig.7-1). Oswald's gun, in effect, did not exist.

The ATF on Nov. 22, 1963.

The ATF was busy in Dallas on the day of the assassination, especially concerning one man who posed a considerable threat to the assassination scenario: FBI agent James P. Hosty, Jr.

As the Warren Report noted, "The FBI opened a file on Oswald in October 1959 when news reports appeared of his defection to the Soviet Union." By 1963, agent Hosty was in charge of Oswald's file. In trying to learn where Oswald was living in Dallas, "on November 4, Hosty telephoned the Texas School Book Depository and learned that Oswald was working there..."

The possibility existed for the plotters that Hosty could have decided to routinely check on Oswald on November 22nd. Consequently, Hosty was kept in a conference with an agent from ATF as well as one from Army Intelligence. "This conference," recalled Hosty. "lasted most of the morning..." Hosty left at 11:45 a.m. Now on his lunch hour, eight hour, be watched the motorcade pass as he stood some

128	Part Part	-																							
Dodd Co	rand total		Bit F-ibooler n. 5-shof blue		rand total	ptal.		d Yard	biue Weston M	2 2	3		rand total	otal	8	blipe	obina.	C. M.	2 2	Type of gun					
Dodd Committee chart of Texas, shows no Smith &					-				1									-		January					
char o Smi																1				February					
rt of				K				-					-					2				8			never traced the magazine from which this was aliend
					1								-		1					April		Aipment	Bx:		
Seaport				YEAR 19				1				YEAR 19			Ì	1		-		Мау	YEAR IN	\$ 10 De	IDIT NO		
Trad				8	1			T			_	8	-							June	-	Hos, Te	28		
					1			Ī	П				-					-		July		9			
shipp	-				1								-				Ì			August					
Traders shipments to		1			1								-							Septem-					
to I					EXECUTE No. 28 Shipments to Delite, Tex. TAAN 191 August Status Status Oddow Name Death Tabley August Status Status Oddow Name Death Tabley TAAN 191 T																				
Dallas.					*					İ			-			1				Novem-					
o .					-																				
													*							Total by					
war	-	3 111	A.C. S. B. C.								_	NCL	au.	SITE	EI	α :	a'll	EN	vor						
Commission Exhibit 790, Oswald's mail order coupon for ".38 St W. 2" Bbl \$29.95"			发光				College College		The state of the s	177	THE PERSON NAMED IN	THE PERSON NAMED IN COLUMN TWO IS NOT THE PERSON NAMED IN COLUMN TWO I	The state of the s		Bounington 79	TO DATE OF MANUAL PARTY OF THE	Mexicaga Bossie 3.65 Tele	Out but	•	M ∴ 'L COUPU~				from which this was clipped.	never traced the magazine

from the depository.

W. MPONTON MOTHER

The ATF also did some follow-up work immediately after the assassination.

According to Dallas Police Chief Curry. "...members of the United States Alcohol Tax unit helped police officers in..." their search around the depository after the assassination. One of the ATF agents was Frank L. Ellsworth.

The ATF and Fllsworth may also have been involved with obtaining the conviction of a businessman whose gunshop carried ammunition for the planted depository rifle. John T. Masen, of Masen's Gun Shop, was reportedly convicted of selling guns without keeping adequate records, on Nov. 14, 1963. His store was one of two places in Dallas where that type of ammunition was available. Had the planted ammunition been purchased there by someone other than Oswald - Masen was unable to identify Oswald as a buyer — records of purchase would be incriminating and would have to be eliminated.

In spring 1964, it was ATF agent Fllsworth, together with Secret Service agents Howlett and Patterson, on their own initiative, who sought to discredit FBI agent Hosty, as well as mislead a Commission assistant counsel in his investigation.

A Job on the Motorcade Route.

As noted earlier, two sites were under consideration for the Dallas luncheon on Nov. 22, 1963: the Trade Mart.


and the Women's Building. The motorcade route through downtown Dallas would depend upon which luncheon site was selected.

The plot required that Oswald find work on one of the two likely motorcade routes. Fig. 7-2 shows both routes with numbers indicating where Oswald looked for work. From Oct. 4th-15th, he sought employment along both motorcade routes, long before the routes or luncheon sites were considered.

A marked map was found by Dallas police among Oswald's 50-a personal belongings at a rooming house. When the map was shown to him during questioning, he remarked, "My God, don't tell me there's a mark near where this thing the assassination happened." Oswald told investigators that he had made a number of marks on the map. "I was looking for work," he said, "and marked the places where I went for jobs and where I heard there were jobs."

Oswald apparently was told not only where to look for work, but also which job to accept. He was offered a job at Love Field where the President's plane landed, and also with a firm that had showrooms in the Trade Mart, where the President's luncheon was to be held. At location number 1.

Trans-Texas Airways offered him a job as a cargo handler for \$310 a month. The job he accepted at the depository, location number 6, paid only \$208.82 a month. Two Warren Commission attorneys took note of this, stating, "standing



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